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INTRODUCTION

In a recent article,1 Frank Cross and I argued that while public
choice scholarship may seem hostile to the delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies, public choice 2 is not by nature anti-delegation. To illustrate this point, we offered a neoProgressive defense of delegation 3 expressed in public choice terms.
Using a simple formal model, we demonstrated why rational voters
might prefer delegation, and why that preference is consistent with
our constitutional design. 4 Of course, our argument did not resolve
the longstanding disputes over the wisdom of either delegation or
public choice theory: both have plenty of critics. 5 In this essay, I will

build upon that earlier argument in two ways: first, by examining the
roots of some legal scholars' dissatisfaction with economic models of
delegation; and second, by exploring in greater detail some of the key
6
features of our public choice case for delegation.

1 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State, 89
GEo. L.J. 97 (2000).
2 As in Spence and Cross, id., and consistent with Farber and Frickey, see, e.g., Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:Positive PoliticalTheory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457
(1992), I use the term "public choice" here to refer to the analytical approach of neoclassical economics-one characterized by a focus on the maximizing behavior of rational individuals. For a more detailed description of public choice approaches to the study of the
delegation issue, see infra Part I. For a good discussion of the relationship among the
terms "public choice," "collective choice," "social choice," and "rational choice," see Farber
& Frickey, supra.
3 Our argument was based upon the notion that expert bureaucrats would do a betterjob of reaching decisions that voters would want, consistent with the defense of agency
autonomy offered by early-twentieth-century Progressives. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
4 For a summary of the argument in greater detail, see infra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
5 Foradescription of both sets of critics, see Spence& Cross, supranote 1, at9 7 -102.
For an example of a critique of public choice in spite of our public choice case for delegation, see Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 109, 114 n.16 (2000) (defining our argument as outside
the public choice tradition because of its "particularly supple" definition of public choice).
For an argument that our definition, supra note 2, is not unusual, see infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text.
6 In this Article I do not revisit the more traditional pro-delegation arguments we
made in our earlier article, including the argument that delegation was consistent with
both Madisonian democratic theory and our constitutional design. See Spence & Cross,
supra note 1, at 102-06 for those arguments.
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I
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DELEGATION, AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES

Administrative law scholars' reactions to public choice scholar8
ship range from qualified acceptance 7 to unconditional rejection,
and many see it as hostile to delegationP In order to understand why
this is so, it is necessary to understand the context in which public
choice models of delegation arose: that is, to trace the historical relationship between public choice scholarship and the larger social science literature within which it fits, as well as the relationship between
administrative law scholarship and the social sciences. The historical
record shows that while administrative law scholars have always borrowed from the social sciences, they have borrowed selectively, adapting social scientific research and tools to their own ends. Today's
reactions to and uses of economic scholarship echo earlier and longstanding disagreements over philosophies of science, disagreements
that become further complicated when social science analyses are imported into a discipline (legal scholarship) that does not classify itself
as a science at all.1°
More specifically, legal scholars react to social scientific analyses
of the law along two orthogonal dimensions: one dimension pits those
who believe that complex social and political phenomena are amenable to "scientific" study against those who do not; the other dimension
pits two groups of social scientists-empiricists and formal theoristsagainst one another. However, while these arguments are not new,
recent developments in the social sciences and in legal scholarshipparticularly the trend toward mathematical sophistication in the social
sciences, and the zeal with which legal scholars have recently em-

7 For examples of qualified acceptance, see the discussion of Professor Robinson's
views, infra note 89 and accompanying text.
8 For examples of unconditional rejection, see Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L.
REv. 167, 168 (1988) (condemning the dim view of human nature he says is fostered by
public choice analyses); and Farina, supra note 5, at 114 ("Taken at its word and applied
with logical rigor, public choice theory is utterly useless to [us]."). Public choice has engendered an equally passionate response among social scientists. See infra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text (summarizing this response).
9 See Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 98-99.
10
Of course, social scientists react to legal scholarship according to their own professional norms and biases as well. Presumably, many social scientists would find traditional
doctrinal analyses of case law to be: (1) overly semantic in their attention to judicial rhetoric and precedent; (2) descriptively unpersuasive, in that their factual premises are not
"scientifically" demonstrated; and/or (3) unscientific in another way, in that they mix normative and descriptive concerns in ways that social scientists try to avoid. My purpose here,
however, is not to examine social scientists' reactions to legal scholarship, but rather to
examine legal scholars' reactions to social science scholarship.
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brought many of these issues back

Law and the Social Sciences: A Mundane Illustration

When legal scholars venture into the world of social science inquiry, they encounter deep-rooted divisions between empirical social
scientists on the one hand, whose scientific method is based upon observation and induction, and formal theorists on the other, whose scientific method is characterized by deductive reasoning from stated
postulates.1 2 Intuition drives legal scholars' reactions to these different forms of analysis, and because human intuition is not uniform,
neither is the legal community's reaction to social scientific treatments of the law. By way of introduction to these issues, consider the
following hypothetical disagreement over a mundane issue.
Geoff and Pamela are a power couple. Both are lawyers working
at the same firm in town. They drive separately to the office each day,
Geoff in their Range Rover and Pamela in their Humvee. Because of
a long-running disagreement between the two over the quickest way to
get from their home to the office, they take different routes each day.
Geoff takes Route A, depicted in Figure 1; Pamela takes Route B. At
the annual Cinco de Mayo party they host at their home, they resume
their argument in front of two friends, one an economist named Plato
and the other a behavioral social scientist named Skinner, each of
whom listens intently. Four days later, on May 9, Plato and Skinner
show up at Geoff and Pamela's door, each claiming to have resolved
the argument.
Skinner's solution is as follows. He reports that he spent the
mornings of May 6 through May 8 interviewing drivers who drove
along the two disputed routes during rush hour, between the hours of
7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. He interviewed three drivers of each route
on each of the three days. He reports that all the drivers indicated
that they drove at the speed traffic allowed, up to the speed limit when
traffic permitted. His survey results are summarized in Table 1 below.
Skinner notes further that the average travel time is twenty-two minutes via Route B, and just over nineteen minutes via Route A, a difference of nearly three minutes. He concludes that Route A has the
shorter travel time, and adds that the probability that he is wrong is
11 Another important part of this development is the powerful reaction to the rise of
law and economics. See infra Part I.B.3.
12 This is not to suggest that all social scientists fall neatly into one of the two camps,
or that all are equally partisan in these philosophy-of-science debates. See infra Part I.B-C.
Rather, I mean only to suggest that this methodological fault line exists and affects how
scholars treat one another's work.
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FIGURE I
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ROUTE A: North on Oak St.; right on Pine St.; left on Elm St.
ROUTE B: North on Oak St.; right on Maple St.; left on Elm St.

less than ten percent.' 3 Geoff turns toward Pamela with a satisfied
smirk.
However, before Geoff can celebrate his victory, Plato disagrees
with Skinner's analysis. Plato has spent the intervening days visiting
TABLE 1
TRAVEL
Date

May 6
May 7
May 8

TiMEs

Route A (min.)

Route B (min.)

19,25,16
17,22,18
18, 21, 17

18,24,21
19,27,23
19, 23, 19

the town traffic department and consulting his map (on which Figure
1 is based), and has determined the following:
1. The two routes cover the same ground except that Route A contains segments yz and zx, while Route B contains segments yw and
WX.
13 This is based upon a t-test of these two distribution means. The test yields a tstatistic of 1.8643 and a probability of error (i.e., probability that the true means are not

different) of less than 0.09.
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2. Maple Street and Pine Street each run in a straight line between
Oak Street and Elm Street.
3. The first turn in Route A, represented by the angle at point y, is a
ninety-degree turn, while the first turn in Route B, represented by
the angle at point w, is a less than a ninety-degree turn.
4. Oak Street and Elm Street are parallel streets over the longitudinal distance between points z and x.
5. Over that same longitudinal distance, the speed limit on each
street (Oak and Elm, respectively) is the same: rok = rEim.
6. Between Oak Street and Elm Street, Maple and Pine each have
the same speed limit: rAfapt = rp.
Furthermore, says Plato, assume that:
7. There are no differences in delays associated with traffic volume
or turns in the two routes.
Then:
8. If [rp,,yz + rFmzx] > [rokyw + rA, pkwx], then Route A is quicker.
If [r .,yz + rTE,.zx] < [rokyw + rjA pkwx], then Route B is quicker.
If [rtiyz + rF,.zx] = [royw + rMapkwx], then neither route is quicker
than the other.
9. Since roak = rEm, and rMqpk = r,,,, we can eliminate the terms representing all of the speed limits, leaving only the distance terms.
10. Since angle w < angle y, then the distance quantity yw + wx must
be less than the distance quantity yz + zx.
11. Hence, Route B must be the quicker route by virtue of being the
shorter distance between the two points.
To which Plato adds the concluding remark: "I have proven that this is
so, Q.E.D." Before Pamela can turn smugly to Geoff, their friends
Plato and Skinner break into a shouting match. Skinner attacks the
premises of Plato's argument, arguing that Route B is routinely more
crowded than Route A, and that regardless of speed limits, drivers
drive more slowly on Route B because it is both the bumpier and the
more scenic route. Plato's logic, says Skinner, is flawed. For his part,
Plato attacks the validity of Skinner's measures, arguing that the sample was not representative because one of the sample days was exceptionally cold and rainy, and because of unusual truck traffic on Route
B from construction on a nearby side street. The drivers say they
drove at the speed limit whenever possible, but can we trust that selfreported information? Can we trust their estimates of their travel
times? Route B may have been slower these last few days, says Plato,
but it was because these last few days were unusual.
Of course, Plato and Skinner are reenacting a very old argument.
Long before modern economists borrowed formal, deductive logic
from physicists, physicists borrowed it from Euclidean geometry. That
logic begins with generally accepted truths or postulates, from which
less obvious truths are deduced. In this example, Plato's analysis is
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performed far from the real world problem he hopes to illuminate; he
nevertheless believes that he is illuminating that problem. Of course,
Skinner is following in John Stuart Mill's footsteps by demanding to
see the empirical proof of Plato's postulates. He argues that analyses
like Plato's are interesting mental exercises that prove nothing;
rather, the ultimate proof must be empirical.
After considering Plato's and Skinner's arguments for twenty-four
hours, Geoff and Pamela decide that both men are right-right about
what is wrong with the other's arguments. Geoff and Pamela believe
that both of their friends' arguments fail to take into account important contextual and circumstantial factors that bear directly on this
issue. On the question of which route is faster, Geoff still agrees with
Skinner, but he thinks Skinner's measurements do not resolve the issue. To the contrary, he is skeptical about Skinner's ability to draw a
representative sample, and about the accuracy of the self-reported
data. Pamela, who still agrees with Plato, finds his proof to be both
unpersuasive and ridiculously formal. She believes that he could have
made his point in three sentences without using mathematical notation, and that his entire argument rests or falls on his seventh assumption (that there are no differences in delays associated with traffic
volumes or turns in the two routes). However, Plato never bothered
to offer any evidence or argument to support that assumption.
Pamela decides that Plato's case would never survive a summary judgment motion. She and Geoff agree that their friends have not resolved the argument, and that they must agree to disagree.
Suppose, however, that Geoff and Pamela had reconvened all of
their party guests on May 9, telling them in advance that they were
soliciting help from Plato and Skinner to resolve a disagreement over
which of the two routes was faster. In that event, we might expect that
some of the party guests would form a priori opinions about the question, perhaps arguing about it with spouses or friends in advance of
the May 9 meeting. When the party guests hear the Skinner and Plato
presentations, we can expect a variety of reactions. Among those who
formed a priori opinions, some may be convinced by the opposing
argument. For example, some of those who favored Route A may find
Plato's proof in favor of Route B irresistible, perhaps because they
firmly believe that his assumption (item number seven) is correct, and
reason that Plato's conclusion therefore follows. Conversely, some
who favored Route B may find Skinner's data persuasive, relying on
their own beliefs that the May 6 through May 8 time period was indeed a representative sample. Still others who formed a priori opinions will not change their minds. Some of those who argued with
spouses and friends in favor of Route A will argue that Skinner is right
and Plato wrong; some of those who were in favor of Route B will
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challenge Skinner's argument and defend Plato's. And if they argue
long enough, we can expect some of the Route A partisans to argue
that Plato's analytical method-deducing his conclusion from stated
premises and assumptions-is fundamentally ill-suited to resolve this
debate; likewise, some of the Route B partisans will reach a similar
conclusion about Skinner's method-drawing an inference from sample data.
The point of this illustration is that legal scholars' reactions to
social science scholarship mirror the reactions of Geoff and Pamela's
party guests to the Skinner-Plato argument. This is neither surprising
nor new. It is not surprising because while legal scholars and social
scientists both use careful and rigorous logic to explain human behavior and institutions, they are guided by very different professional
norms and seek different ends. Social scientists generally eschew normative arguments, limiting themselves to the search for general, factual truths. By contrast, lawyers embrace both case-specific context
and argument, normative or otherwise.1 4 However, legal scholars who
are reasonably unpersuaded by a particular social scientific argument
sometimes conclude, unreasonably, that the social scientist's analytical
method is therefore faulty. I believe that legal scholars' indictment of
public choice theory is sometimes overly broad in this way, and that a
brief review of the historical relationship between the social sciences
and administrative law scholarship will help explain why that is so.
B.

Administrative Law and the Social Sciences: An Historical
Sketch
1.

Getting Beyond Politics: Progressives and Legal Realists

Of course, the rise of the administrative state in the early years of
the twentieth century coincided with a surge in popularity of the social sciences, both artifacts of the Progressive impulse. 15 With hindsight, the Progressives' faith in science, and in social science in
particular, seems a bit naive. Reacting as they were to the bossism of
the party era in American history,' 6 Progressive scholars combined a
cynical view of politics and politicians with a kind of myopic faith in
14
Legal scholars might claim that their approach to normative issues is more forthright and that social scientists sometimes fail to acknowledge (maybe even to themselves)
their normative biases.
15
For arguments that these developments were not merely coincidental, see MARY 0.
FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY (1975); and THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1977).

16 For an example of the Progressive attack on bossism in politics, see WILLIAM ALLEN
WHITE, THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH 19 (1910) (lamenting the "extra-constitutional place of
the boss in government . . . as the extra-constitutional guardian of business"). See also
JOSEPH LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 79-119 (Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1968) (1906) (extolling Progressive politician Robert LaFollette as a hero).
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the ability of "scientific" administration to cleanse policymaking of the
(inherently corrupt) influence of politics. Placing public administration in the hands of permanent civil servants would, in Woodrow Wilson's words, "clear[ ] the moral atmosphere of official life by
establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust."'17 As the
administrative state began to mature in the first half of the twentieth
century, social scientists like Wilson, Frank Goodnow, 18 Max Weber, 19
and others articulated a vision, naive or not, of more rational, less
political government. It was a vision of scientific management that
mirrored the efficiency revolution underway in the field of business
management, 20 one in which an administrative state insulated from
political control could develop expertise and apply it to solving public
problems.
For their part, legal scholars-particularly the legal realists-embraced many of these same sentiments. Indeed, the Progressive view
of the administrative state seems to have dominated administrative law
during the pre-World War II era. In his seminal administrative law
text,James Landis touted the "advantages of specialization" made possible through the administrative state. 2 ' Among those advantages,
wrote Landis, was Congress's newfound ability to delegate policymaking to agencies. 2 2 According to Landis, delegation made frequent
statutory fine-tuning unnecessary and made for better policy.2 3 Not
only that, it "gives some assurance against the entry of impertinent
considerations into the deliberations relating to a projected solution." 24 Thus, like his fellow legal realists, Landis shared the Progressives' belief in better government through specialization and
expertise.
But legal realists' embrace of science was instrumental, not philosophical. Social scientists, then as now, sought to use the scientific
method to discover and explain the rules of human behavior. For
them, discerning these truths was an end in itself. Not so the legal
realists, for whom social science was just one of the tools they brought
to bear on the task of reforming government and law.2 5 This explains

Karl Llewellyn's observation that legal realists were willing to divorce
17
18

Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCL
See, e.g., FRANKJ.

GOODNOW,

Q. 197, 210 (1887).

PoLrncs AND ADMINISTRATION (Russell & Russell 1967)

(1900).

19 See, e.g., Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 23 (Jay M.
Schafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 1978).
20

See SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPuFT (1964).

21
22
23

JAMES M. LANIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938).
Id. at 68.

24
25

Id. at 69.

Id. at 68-70.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44

HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1236 (1931).
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descriptive from normative analyses only temporarily;26 that is, they
used scientific methods to gather a description of the world that they
could use. Just as Progressive activists used science to replace a corrupt patronage system that resisted reform, legal realists used it to reform a legal system that produced (what they saw as) the injustices of
the Lochner era. 27 Thus, while Progressives saw agencies as the antidote to politics run amok, legal realists saw agencies as the antidote to
courts run amok.28 Each saw delegation to agencies as an instrument
of social change that could help break the grip of business and conservatives on different parts of the policy process.
The legal realists' embrace of social science did not go unchallenged. Walter Cook's 1927 essay on the "scientific method" 29 laid
bare old disagreements between empiricists and theoreticians, and
challenged the usefulness of both forms of inquiry:
[T] he naive belief that men think in syllogisms and that new truth
about the world can be deduced from general laws arrived at by
induction, still persists in much of the thinking that goes on in the
field of the social sciences. It is a curious paradox that when men
are confronted with situations still more complex than those found
in the physical and biological sciences.., the more insistent do they
become as to the prior existence of fixed and universal principles or
laws which can be discovered and directly applied and followed....
As a result they either fail to discover what their problems are or to
30
deal adequately with them if they do.
Given the nature of legal reasoning and the case-specific nature
of legal analysis, it is unsurprising that legal scholars were dubious
about the value of social scientific analysis. Indeed, at the time, this
skepticism provoked a lively and sophisticated debate over such issues
as the value of statistical analysis in the study of legal issues,3 1 including administrative law,3 2 and psychology's behavioral critique of Paretian economics.3 3 Thus, even if administrative law scholars tended to
agree about the benefits of delegation, they seem to have understood
26

Id.

27

See id.

28
29

See id. at 1236-37.
Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927).
30
Id. at 307.
31 See, e.g., Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. Rav. 609
(1923) (offering an early defense of statistical behavioralism); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What
Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8J. LEGAL EDUc. 399, 401 (1956) (attacking Moore's statistical analysis as "the nadir of idiocy").
32 See HAROLD J. LAsKi, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE (1919) (using social scientific analysis to discuss the modem, increasingly administrative, state).
33
See Peter H. Odegard, Book Review, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 686 (1936) (reviewing THURMAN W. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935)).
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the philosophical and methodological undertones of their substantive
arguments as well as today's scholars do.
2.

Getting Beyond (Way Beyond) Naiiveti: BringingPolitics Back In

By the early 1940s, public administration theorists like Herman
Finer and Carl Friedrich had begun to argue over the wisdom of
agency autonomy.a4 But the critique of the Progressive model did not

gather steam until after the war. The challenge came from sociologists and economists, sometimes by way of political science. All of
these challengers took issue with the picture of the professional, dispassionate bureaucrat painted by Progressives, although in different
ways. Members of the dismal science, using the mathematical notation and deductive logic of formal theory, began to paint a dismal
picture of politics in general and of the administrative state in particular. To economists and their allies within political science, the policy
process was a kind of Hobbesian free-for-all dominated by interest
groups and their political allies.3 5 They portrayed agencies as just another tool of these private interests, created and sustained in order to
provide those interests with political "rents,"3 6 irrespective of any
sense of the public good. Indeed, many cited Arrow's Theorem for
the proposition that there was no such thing as the public good,37 and
portrayed the state as nothing more than that at which private inter34
See, e.g., Herman Finer, Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government, 1 PUB.
ArMIN. REv. 335 (1941) (arguing that bureaucrats should be faithful to their elected representatives, not to their own notions of the public good); Carl Joachim Friedrich, Public
Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, 1 PUB. POL'Y 3 (1940) (arguing that bureaucrats should exercise their discretion because political control is ineffective and the
popular will is an unreliable guide).
35 This is a varied literature, and includes WiALskm A. NISKANN,JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIvE GOVERNMENT (1971) (emphasizing the ways bureaucrats use their information advantages to take advantage of politicians); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theoy of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (portraying regulation as a private rentseeking activity); and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 J. ECON. &
MGrr. Sci. 3 (1971) (same). For an update of this literature, see generally THE BUDGETMAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andr6 Blais & Stdphane Dion eds.,
1991). A milder but related view was Mancur Olson's group theory, which echoed group
theorists in political science by emphasizing the ways groups represent certain interests
better than others. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLEGTcIVE AcrION (1965).
36
SeeJoseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators:
Testing for Principal-AgentSlack in PoliticalInstitutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990); Stigler,
supra note 35.
37
KENNETHJ. ARROiW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press
1963) (1951). Of course, Arrow's Theorem demonstrated the logical impossibility of devising a collective choice mechanism capable of satisfying simultaneously several desirable
characteristics commonly held as essential attributes of democracy. Id. at 107. Arrow's
Theorem echoed earlier work by mathematicians like Condorcet, who demonstrated the
sensitivity of collective choice outcomes to manipulation of the voting agenda, and produced an enormous scholarly reaction, including a great deal of work attempting to
demonstrate ways in which constitutions and legislatures modify some of Arrow's conditions to make meaningful social choice possible. For a summary of the pre-Arrow scholar-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:397

ests pulled and tugged.3 8 To the extent that these economic models
addressed agencies' motives at all, they tended to assume that agency
bureaucrats were primarily maximizers of their own resources and
power who used their expertise to take advantage of their political
overseers, rather than conscientious professionals discharging a statu39
tory duty.

The challenge from sociology's organization theory was different,
and focused on politics as a source of complexity that limited bureaucrats' opportunity to pursue their goals, whatever those goals might
be. 40 Like their economic counterparts, these analyses aimed to account for the role of political power and its influence on the bureaucracy. 4 1 However, where economists took the rational, motivated

individual as their unit of analysis, organization theorists took a bird's
eye view of the process, 42 and emphasized empiricism and inductive
reasoning in the search for general truths about organizational behavior. 43

Borrowing from psychology, they focused instead on how

larger, political forces can overwhelm human cognition, 44 rendering
ship, see WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); and Nicholas R. Miller et
al., The Geometry of Majority Rule, I J. THEORETICAL POL. 379 (1989).

38 Of course, this view stood in stark contrast to the Weberian idea of the state as an
independent third party. See Weber, supra note 19.
39 See, e.g., NISKANEN, supra note 35 (describing agency bureaucrats as resourcemaximizers).
40
Organization theorists drew on the earlier work of sociologists like Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, and focused on the organizations as entities rather than assemblages of individuals-as systems worthy of study in their own right. Perhaps the best
known of these theories was Charles Lindblom's model of "muddling through," which emphasized the ways in which political complexity negates administrators' ability to plan rationally and implement fundamental or drastic change. Rather, because of that
complexity, policy change occurs only incrementally. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science
of "MuddlingThrough, "19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79 (1959). See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for additional examples.
41 See, e.g., Norton E. Long, Power and Administration, 9 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 257, 257
(1949) (decrying the "forlorn spectacle" of an agency "possessed of statutory life, armed
with executive orders, sustained in the courts, yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of
power").
42 See Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage CanModel of OrganizationalChoice, 17 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 1, 2-8 (1972) (describing the organizational decision process in terms of similar
"streams" or forces); Lindblom, supra note 40 (emphasizing the limits of human intention
in the face of organizational forces).
43 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, The Proverbs of Administration, 6 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 53, 62
(1946) ("Before a science can develop principles, it must possess concepts ....
These
concepts, to be scientifically useful, must be operational; that is, their meanings must correspond to empirically observable facts or situations."); see also Robert A. Dahl, The Science of
Public Administration: Three Problems, 7 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 1, 11 (1947) ("We are a long way
from a science of public administration. No science of public administration is possible
unless.., there is a body of comparative studies from which it may be possible to discover
principles and generalities that transcend national boundaries and peculiar historical
experiences.").
44 See, for example, psychologist Abraham H. Maslow's challenge to rationalist assumptions of human motivation, which argued that social needs motivate people at least as
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impotent even the most ideologically pure and scientifically minded
Wilsonian civil servant. Thus, the organization theorists challenged
not only earlier theories of scientific management, but also their contemporaries within economics. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon, for example, contested the postulates of the Progressive view of public
administration by objecting to the very possibility of rationality as eco45
nomic models described it.

For their part, political science treatments of administrative agencies were deeply affected by both of these critiques of the Progressive
model. Interest group theorists like David Truman were already
describing the policy process as the rope in a tug of war between competing interest groups. 46 It was thus a short leap to the conclusion
that wealthy groups, like business organizations, could dominate the
process because of their resource advantages 47 and their ability to organize. 48 Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, the prominence of interest
group theories, capture theory, and other theories of industry dominance led many to the conclusion reached by political scientist Theodore Lowi: by delegating policymaking authority to administrative
49
agencies, Congress abdicated its policymaking responsibility.
much as economic needs. A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PsYcH. R v. 370
(1943). Herbert Simon's theories of"satisficing" and "bounded rationality" later paved the
way for the modem behavioral models of decisionmaking heuristics, such as those popularized by Kahneman and Tversky. See Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science, 79 AM. POL Sci. REV. 293 (1985) (explaining the
significance of"bounded rationality" in political models); cf. Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make
Cognitive Illusions Disappear:.Beyond "Heuristicsand Biases," in 2 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1991) (challenging the experimental data purporting to show errors in the way humans use information). Strangely, it is
not uncommon to see law review articles challenging economic models of the law on these
very same grounds without a single reference to Simon's work.
45 Simon, supra note 44, at 295-97.
46 See, e.g., DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 505 (V.0. Key, Jr. ed.,
1951) (examining "interest groups and their role in the formal institutions of government
in order to .. . evaluat[e] their significance in the American political process").
47 As the political scientist Schattschneider put it, "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent
of the people cannot get into the pressure system." E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34-35 (Dryden Press 1975)
(1960); see also CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, PoLrncs AND MA --ETs (1977) (analyzing resource
advantages).
48 Of course, Mancur Olson's economic argument attempted to logically demonstrate
why smaller, better-heeled interest groups (like business organizations) could organize
more easily than mass, public interest groups. Olson further reasoned that the mass interests were underrepresented in the policy process as a result. OLSON, supra note 35, at
14-43. For an update of Olson's analysis, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982);
and TODD SANDLER, CoL.ECrVE AGtION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992).
49 See THEODOREJ. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). See also C. Wright Mills'
earlier argument that dominance of the policy process by "elites" effectively shuts out the
interests of non-elites:
From the individual's standpoint, much that happens seems the result of
manipulation, of management, of blind drift; authority is often not explicit;
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Thus, the debate had traveled half the circle: by the early 1970s,
delegation was no longer the antidote to conservative dominance of
the policy process; rather, it was the route to that dominance. While
this growing skepticism toward agency policymaking did not provoke
a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, it did provoke ajudicial reaction-what Richard Stewart called a "reformation" of administrative
law. 50 Fearing that agencies were susceptible to capture and subversion of their regulatory mission, courts began to impose constraints
on agencies that were designed to protect the interests of underrepresented groups. 51 The expansion of standing rights, the "hard
look" doctrine, and other developments in administrative law in the
1960s and 1970s can be understood in this light, as attempts by the
courts to "increase the government's role in protecting the health and
safety of its citizens and to decrease the influence of industry in regulatory policymaking."5 2 After this transformation, politicians could
delegate power to agencies with the knowledge that administrative law
had been redesigned to guard against the risk of capture.
3.

Getting Beyond Methodology: More Recent Developments

Of course, neither the methodological debate 53 nor the debate
over delegation 54 has abated in the last two decades. However, the
those with power often feel no need to make it explicit and to justify it.
That is one reason why ordinary men, when they are in trouble or when
they sense that they are up against issues, cannot get clear targets for
thought and for action; they cannot determine what it is that imperils the
values they vaguely discern as theirs.
C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 169-70 (1959).
50 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1669 (1975).
51 See id. at 1712 ("Faced with the seemingly intractable problem of agency discretion,
courts... [assured the] fair representation for all affected interests in the exercise of the
legislative power delegated to agencies.").
52

R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 4

(1983); see alsoWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REv. 275, 278-79 (1988) (suggesting a kind of
judicial review as counterweight to the power of interest groups);Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive PoliticalTheory: The Tug of War over AdministrativeAgencies, 80 GEo.
L.J. 671, 696-97 (1992) (arguing that courts sometimes interpret legislation for the benefit
of the less powerful).
53 See infra Part I.C.
54 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 142 (1997) (positing that the "attempt to translate public choice
theory into a brand of welfare economics cannot succeed"); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation:Back to Basics, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 807, 812 (1999) (arguing that the
Founders meant to balance legislative power with a strong executive only because they
assumed that the electorally accountable executive would be able to exert effective control
over executive-branch activities); TheodoreJ. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1987) (continuing his assault on delegation as a tool for power abuses by powerful interest groups); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Wy AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
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former debate has benefited from an increasing appreciation for
cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of delegation and its effects,
as scholars from the various methodological camps continue to infiltrate one another's lines. Empiricists' critiques of economic models
have led the latter to produce analyses of legislative 55 and administrative agency behavior that are more sophisticated and more nuanced
than their methodologically purer ancestors. For example, political
scientists and legal scholars have produced formal models of the delegation process 5 6 that model the various government actors (politicians, agencies, interest groups, courts) as policy-maximizers, rather
than mere maximizers of their own wealth and power. One strain of
this literature uses formal logic and spatial modeling to illustrate the
ways in which agencies can use their first-mover advantages to play
politicians off against one another, making political control of policy
difficult. 57 Another approach looks inside the agency decisionmaking
process to mathematically model the complexity described by organization theory scholars years ago.58 Yet another body of work focuses
81 (1985) (responding to public choice critiques of delegation, and defending the latter as
necessary and efficient); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics,
20 CARDozo L. REV. 731, 732-35 (1999) (arguing that delegation to experts represents an
abdication of responsibility by elected politicians); David Schoenbrod, Environmental Law
and Growing Up, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 357, 364 (1989) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Growing Up]
(arguing that the Clean Air Act is an overly broad delegation); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond
Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 323 (1987) (defending broad delegation along Progressive lines); see also Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 100-01 (drawing from Mashaw's
critique of public choice, and presenting "a Madisonian argument for deliberative decisionmaking in the modem administrative state... that mirrors non-public-choice defenses
of administrative agencies as loci of deliberation" (footnotes omitted)).
55
See discussion of work by Weingast and Marshall infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
56
See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Agency Expertise: CongressionalChoices
About Administrative Procedures, 89 Am. POL. Sci. RFV. 62 (1995); David Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Administrative Procedures,Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci.
697 (1994).
57
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo.
LJ. 523, 528-33 (1992); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on the
Bureaucracy, 6J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1 (1990); Thomas H. Hammond &Jack H. Knott, Who
Controls the Bureaucracyi:PresidentialPower, CongressionalDominance, Legal Constraints, and
BureaucraticAutonomy in a Model of Multi-InstitutionalPolicy-Making, 12 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
119 (1996). In spatial models, the actors' preferences over policy outcomes are represented as utility distributions in Euclidean space, with the point of maximum utility representing each actor's "ideal point." Traditionally, models like these assume that policy
outcomes and individual actors' preferences over those outcomes can be represented as
points on a line. These models often assume that individuals' preferences (their utility
distributions over the range of choice) are single-peaked, and that each actor's preference
for any particular outcome (i.e., her utility) is in direct inverse proportion to that outcome's distance from her ideal point.
58
See GARvJ. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DiL.mmeAs (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds.,
1992); Jonathan Bendor, A Model of Muddling Through, 89 Am. POL. Scl. REv. 819 (1995);
Jonathan Bendor & Thomas H. Hammond, Rethinking Allison's Models, 86 Ami. POL Sci.
REv. 301 (1992).
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on how politicians can use law to constrain agency independence. 59
For their part, empiricists have also entered this fray, attempting to
derive and test hypotheses generated by many of these public choice
models of delegation. Indeed, it is not uncommon these days for
quantitative empiricists to borrow the theoretical framework for their
analyses from formal economic models.60 Similarly, the resurgence of
the behavioral critique of law and economics 6 1 represents a further
attempt at methodological and theoretical integration. 62 The result
of all this cross-disciplinary dialogue is a rich and growing body of
literature examining the distribution of influence within the policymaking process.
An equally important feature of this more recent interdisciplinary
work is that it represents a reaction, by public choice and non-public
choice scholars, to earlier analyses, by public choice and non-public
choice scholars, that stressed the dangers of runaway bureaucracy.
For example, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast's "Congressional dominance" theory explored Congress's role in the "transformation" that
Professor Stewart described from a public choice perspective, particularly the ways in which Congress can structure the agency decision
process to steer the agency in particular substantive directions and to

59 See Bawn, supra note 56; Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 56; Matthew D. McCubbins et al., AdministrativeProceduresas Instruments of PoliticalControl,3J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243,
253-64 (1987); David B. Spence, ManagingDelegation Ex Ante: UsingLaw to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1999).

The literature on politicians' control of agencies illustrates this point. See B. DAN
DNA~mcs (1994); Randall L. Calvert et al.,
CongressionalInfluence over Policymaking: The Case of the FTC, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND
POLICY 493 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987); EvanJ. Ringquist, Political
60

WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERZMAN, BUREAUCRATIC

Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality, 39 Am. J. POL. Scl. 336 (1995);
Spence, supra note 59; B. Dan Wood, Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC, 34 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 503 (1990); B. Dan Wood, Principals,Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air

Enforcements, 82 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 213 (1988); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy,85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 801 (1991).
61
"Behavioral law and economics" approaches exist on the cusp between economics
and psychology, and many attempt to graft pyschologists' ideas about the limits of human
cognition and rationality onto economic models of the law in interesting ways. See, e.g.,

Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471

(1998). While behavioral law and economics is a relatively new phenomenon in law review
literature, these approaches derive from 1940s scholarship on bounded rationality by Simon and Maslow. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Simon and many of his
progeny are viewed as critics of economic models, but some of their works were also early
attempts to integrate economic and "behavioral" models. Perhaps the best known example is Cyert and March's "behavioral theory of the firm." RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G.
MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FImM (Herbert A. Simon ed., 1965).
62
For an interesting argument that rational actor models and behavioral psychology
models are not inconsistent and yield similar hypotheses, see William T. Bianco, Different
Paths to the Same Result: Rational Choice, PoliticalPsychology, and Impression Formationin Campaigns,42 AM. J. POL. Sc. 1061 (1998).
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limit its effective discretion. 63 Administrative law scholars are likewise
participating in this evolution toward greater methodological integration and a subtler view of agency policymaking. For example, some
have reacted to their predecessors' emphasis on administrative formality and legalism as an antidote to capture by lamenting the "ossification" that formalism has caused; 64 still others defend formalism on a
variety of grounds, including as a defense against capture. 65
C.

Zen and the Art vs. Science Debate

Why recite this history? For two reasons. First, I hope to demonstrate that public choice scholarship has moved beyond the dark "creation myth," described by Cynthia Farina,6 6 that "posits the innate
depravity or corruption" of administrative bodies and of regulation in
general. 6 7 Some legal scholars (proponents and opponents alike)
have been slow to recognize that this dark version of public choice is
63
Much of the theoretical and empirical work on political control of the bureaucracy
supports this argument-to varying degrees. SeeWooD & WATERMAN, supra note 60; Bawn,
supra note 56; Epstein & O'Halloran, supa note 56;James T. Hamilton, Going By the (Informal) Book: The EPA's Use of Informal Rules and EnforcingHazardous Waste Laws, in 7 ADVANCES
IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIc GROWTH 109 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 1996);James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulatorsand
the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures:The Selection of Formalvs. Informal Rules in RegulatingHazardous Waste, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1994); McCubbins et al., supra note 59;

Spence, supra note 59.
64
Mark Seidenfeld recognizes the ossification problem, but believes that its potentially negative effects are muted in practice by agencies' adaptive behavior, and that proposed solutions may do more harm than good. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules:
Flexible Regulationand Constraintson Agency Discretion,51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 494-95 (1999).
65
There is a very large literature on the ossification problem. See, e.g., Robert A.
Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification:A HarderLook at Agency Policy Statements, 31
WAKE FoREsr L. REV. 667, 676-80 (1996); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 18 (1997) (arguing that "adversarialism... has
contributed to a rigid rule-making and implementation process that fails to encourage
creativity, adaptation, and cooperation in solving regulatory problems"); William Funk,
BargainingToward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public

Interest 46 DuKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (defending formalism on democratic theory grounds);

Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADnMIN. L. REV. 7, 26 (1998); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking. A Response to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75 TEx.
L. REV. 525 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossfying"the RulemakingProcess, 41 DuE. LJ. 1385 (1992); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIIN. L. REv. 59, 82-86 (1995); Seidenfeld, supra note 64 (arguing, among other
points, that agencies' ability to evade procedural mandates helps ameliorate the ossification problem); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to
ModijJudicialReview of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEx. L. REV. 483 (1997); Cass R.
Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247
(1996) (advocating more adaptive rules).
66
Farina, supranote 5, at 109-10.
67
Id. at 110. See also Theodore Lowi's critique of public choice, which seems to
accept this dark view of the literature. See, e.g., Lowi, supra note 49, at 310-13. Indeed,
Professor Lowi's objection to public choice seems to be an outgrowth of his more general
objection to "interest group liberalism." See e.g., Theodore Lowi, The PublicPhilosophy:Interest-GroupLiberalism, 61 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 5, 19 (1967) (decrying the legitimization of gov-
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either an anachronism or a caricature, and that a less monolithic,
more nuanced and flexible kind of law and economics has burrowed
its way into administrative law scholarship. This distinction between
what public choice is and how it has been used is an important predicate to the analysis in Part II. Second, by attempting to put public
choice analyses of delegation into their historical and epistemological
context, I hope to make it easier to understand the philosophical reasons why nonbelievers react to public choice analyses as they do. This
context is important, as the growing influence of economic models
within political science and law has fanned the embers of old methodological debates.
Clearly, public choice models have moved beyond the assumption that human beings are guided by base or venal motives. 68 The
debate over public choice methods has moved beyond this kind of
cynicism to a related issue: namely, the subtler question of whether
human beings can act rationally in the broader sense. This question,
in turn, breaks down into at least two parts: (1) whether people process information in ways suggested by public choice models; and (2)
whether they behave instrumentally or are goal-maximizers at all.
Scholars working under the banner of behavioral law and economics address both of these questions. The intellectual descendants
of Herbert Simon continue to explore the ways heuristics, biases, and
other limitations on human cognition prevent people from behaving
in a purely rational fashion. 69 Another Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen,
heads a long list of scholars who argue that, cognitive limitations
aside, humans often do not act instrumentally in any case, but are
guided instead by social norms (of duty, altruism, and the like) or the
desire to act expressively. 70 If these scholars are correct, does that
ernment by clash of private interests, a system in which such conflicts become "a principle
of government rather than a criminal act").
68
See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 10
(1983) (contrasting "rational man," who merely acts purposively and logically, with "economic man," who is selfish as well); Jon Elster, Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive
Ambition, 94 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 685, 692 (2000) [hereinafter Elster, Excessive Ambition]
("[R]ational choice theory can easily accommodate nonmaterial or nonselfish interests.
What matters is whether the actors pursue their goals in an instrumentally rational manner, not whether these goals are defined in terms of material self-interest."); Morris P.
Fiorina, Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise,9 CRITICAL REV.
85, 87 (1995) ("[T]he only thing that all [rational choice] people would agree upon is that
their explanations presume that individuals behave purposively.").
69 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67 (Robin
M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986).
70
See, e.g., STEPHEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 244-45 (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1987) (arguing that while rational, instrumental action is the norm in the economic realm,
it is not the primary motivating force of human behavior in the political and social realm);
Elster, Excessive Ambition, supra note 68, at 692 ("[E]ven when expanded to include broader
goals, rational choice theory is often inadequate because people may not conform to the
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mean that public choice models serve no purpose? Of course not. As
others have noted, public choice models can (and some have tried to)
accommodate some of these extra-rational effects on human behavior.7 1 Alternatively, these two families of models can coexist because
both explain important aspects of human behavior. That is, sometimes people act instrumentally; sometimes they do not.
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that public choice scholars
have not met the burden of demonstrating empirical support for their
embrace of instrumental rationality as the most important motivator
of political behavior. 72 While Green and Shapiro would place the burden of proof squarely on public choice scholars, the jury is still out on
this empirical question. Furthermore, it is important to recognize
that they fault public choice for failing to live up to the scientific standards of quantitative empiricism; however, that is not a legal scholar's
standard. Rather, legal scholars try to persuade, and some find public
choice persuasive. Moreover, other legal scholars' skepticism toward
public choice probably implies not an endorsement of quantitative
empiricism, but rather a general skepticism toward social science. In
effect, if a model (theoretical or statistical) seems to fail to capture
accurately the essence of the social problem it purports to investigate,
the reader may logically discount the model's implications. An economic theorist, in his quest.for parsimony, may produce a formal
model that abstracts away too much reality by employing unreasonable or erroneous assumptions. 7 3 Likewise, a quantitative empiricist
may make an analogous error by mis-specifying her model 74 or by
canons of instrumental rationality."); id. at 694 ("[N]onrational motivations are important
and pervasive."); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundationsof
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); Michael Taylor, BatteringRAMs, 9 CRITICAL
REV. 223, 228-31 (1995) (crediting expressive behavior and intrinsic motivations-not instrumental rationality-with greater explanatory power in the political and social realm).
71 See Bianco, supra note 62 (noting the remarkable similarities between psychologist
Susan Fiske's model of voters as "motivated tacticians" who formulate and update their
impressions of candidates, and traditional models of voters as rational actors who consider
the transaction costs of gathering information and engage in "Bayesian updating" when
they do acquire more information); Elster, Excessive Ambition, supra note 68; see alsoJolls et
al., supra note 61, at 1474 (using behavioral economics "to model and predict behavior
relevant to law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate
assumptions about human behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions
about law").
72

DONALD P.

GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

(1994). The book provoked a book-length response. See Symposium on Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, 9 CRrICAL REv. 25 (1995).
73 Some scholars argue that Mancur Olson's familiar analysis of interest group formation represents just such an example. For a discussion of this literature, see SANDLER, supra
note 48, at 23-25. For critiques of Olson, see John Chamberlin, Provisionof Collective Goods
as a Function of Group Size, 68 Am. POL. Scd. REv. 707 (1974); Norman Frohlich & Joe A.
Oppenheimer, I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends,23 WORLD POL. 104 (1970).
74 That is, the modeler may underspecify the model by omitting important explanatory variables, or overspecify the model by including irrelevant variables. A quantitative
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operationalizing variables poorly. 75 Some legal scholars may be persuaded that these sorts of errors are unavoidable-that the study of
social phenomena is more of an art than a science-and that context
77
is crucial. 76 If so, they share that conclusion with many historians,
7
9
78
public management scholars, and others.
However, it is important to recognize that this is an intuitive judgment, one that guarantees that the ultimate persuasiveness of social
scientific models will always be in the eye of the beholder. In his
methods professor of mine once used the following as his example of an underspecified
model: The price of whiskey = f {minister's salaries). That model may yield statistically
significant results; however, it is probably a spurious relationship caused by an omitted
third variable.
75 In other words, the statistical model may be properly specified, but the data the
modeler uses to measure the variables are a poor measure of those variables.
76 It is in this context that I understand Professor Farina's argument that once public
choice scholars begin to accommodate unselfish motives, they are "cheating," and their
method becomes "incoherent" and loses its theoretical power. See Farina, supra note 5, at
112; see also GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 72, at 27-28, 192-93 (arguing that rational
choice theorists arbitrarily restrict the domain of their analyses-they call this "segmented
universalism"-so as to insulate those analyses from empirical refutation). I will concede
that public choice theory does not offer a universal explanation of human behavior that
yields "point predictions" of human behavior in any and all situations. However, I disagree
that that characteristic renders public choice useless. Responding to Green and Shapiro's
version of this argument, Professors Ferejohn and Satz argued that rationality-based analyses can be "illuminating" even if they do not provide a "unique" explanation for an event
or predict outcomes across a wide variety of settings. See John Ferejohn & Debra Satz,
Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory, 9 CITICAL REv. 71, 75 (1995). See also
Professor Fiorina's argument that an analysis can be useful even if it provides only a "ceteris
paribus" rather than "monocausal" explanation of events. See Fiorina, supra note 68, at
88-89. To me, Professor Farina's threshold of usefulness seems an unreasonably difficult
one to meet; it is also consistent with the view that the study of agency policymaking is
more of an art than a science. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:
Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. Rxv. 987, 989 (1997) (describing
the "inescapable messiness" of administrative law as "an ongoing, and necessarily adaptive,
inquiry").
77 Robert Skidelsky, historian and biographer ofJohn Maynard Keynes, described the
dangers of trying to understand Keynes's theory:
The first thing to do was obvious: learn economics. This is easier said than
done. It meant learning a style of thinking which is alien to the historian.
Economics is a branch of logic; history is analytical description, based on
evidence. There are no "models" in history, because every event is unique.
This is especially true of biography.
It was equally important not to get bamboozled by economics; not to
lose the historian's sense that economic ideas always have a context, and
that biography is above all about context not propositions.
Robert Skidelsky, Skidelsky on Keynes, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2000, at 83.
78 This issue consumed an issue of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management in
1994. See Symposium on Public Management Scholarship, 13 J. PoL'v ANALYsIs & MGMT. 231
(1994).
79 This tension between appreciating context and the desire to generalize hangs particularly heavily over the field of comparative politics. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, Comparing
and Miscomparing,3 J. THEORETICAL POL. 243, 252-53 (1991) (distinguishing case studies,
an "ideographic" method of analysis that sacrifices generality for depth of understanding,
with science, which sacrifices context for generality).
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8 0 Robert Pir1970s bestseller Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,
sig argued that some of us have a "classical" understanding of the
world, one that focuses on "underlying forms" rather than surface appearances, and tries "to bring order out of chaos and make the unknown known." 81 Others, he said, have a "romantic" understanding,
one that focuses on "immediate appearance," and is skeptical about
the possibility of discerning laws governing the unknown. 82 Regardless of whether psychologists would endorse Pirsig's armchair theorizing, his taxonomy seems to echo methodological debates within
administrative law.8 3 That is, public choice analyses of delegation
seem to provoke very different yet equally passionate reactions from
scholars-reactions that may be traceable, at least in part, to those
scholars' differing intuitions about how the world works.
Recent developments in the social sciences have added fuel to
this art-versus-science debate. Economics and political science, from
which many social scientific analyses of delegation come, have grown
increasingly mathematical in recent decades. Increasing mathematical sophistication-both in formal theories and statistical modelsincreases the skepticism with which others view social scientific models. Mathematical sophistication can render an analysis inaccessible to
the less mathematically sophisticated, irrespective of the worth or
value of the analysis. 84 More importantly, the quantification imperative can divert social scientists' attention away from interesting issues
that are not amenable to quantification. By studying only that which
can be quantified, social scientists may miss important aspects of the
delegation problem. This phenomenon is probably why so many empirical tests of the ability of politicians to control agency behavior focus on dependent variables like enforcement rates, inspection rates,
and the like,8 5 which are much easier to quantify than the substantive
content of policy decisions.

80
81

82
83

M. PIRSIG,
Id. at 73-74.
ROBERT

ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE

(1974).

Id.
Michael Laver describes rational actor theories as "posit and deduce" social sci-

ence, which is a search for "non-trivial tautological arguments." MICHAEL LAVER, THE
POLITICS OF PRIVATE DESIREs 11 (1981) (emphasis omitted). He contrasts this approach
with inductive theories, which test the world as it really is. See id.at 11-13.
84 An economic historian recently described modem economics as "so formal, or
mathematicised, that even economists can no longer understand what they are saying to
each other, still less the educated public." See Skidelsky, supra note 77, at 84. Indeed, the
trend toward mathematical sophistication in political science recently produced a minor
revolt by political scientists who argued that the discipline's leading journal had grown
inaccessible to the majority of political scientists for the very same reasons. Emily Eakin,
PoliticalScientists Leading a Revolt, Not Studying One, N.Y. Timrs, Nov. 4, 2000, at Bll.
85 For a more detailed explanation of this point, see David B. Spence, Agency Policy
Making and PoliticalControl: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. &
THEORY 199 (1997).
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Such apparent methodological myopia may feed the perception
that the study of administrative agencies is an art rather than a science. Clearly, however, there are many for whom the tools of economic analysis illuminate the relationship between administrative
agencies and other institutions. That much is apparent from the increasing importance of economic models within administrative law
scholarship. Nor is it difficult to discern the appeal of economic models for legal scholars. While the economist's quest for parsimony conflicts with the lawyer's appreciation for context, both embrace
rigorous logic as an analytical technique. In the absence of an empirical resolution of the debate over human motivation, rational actor
models are useful because they can illuminate the incentives facing
those actors who do have the inclination and opportunity to act instrumentally, 86 and because they help scholars think more precisely
about political and legal problems.8 7 Hence their appeal to legal
scholars, whose professional norms do not require them to prove factual truths scientifically (or to even try) .88 My own view is that for
these modest reasons, public choice methods lend themselves nicely
to the study of politics and law.89 It is in this spirit that I will use these
methods in the next Part of this Article.

86
Political scientist Morris Fiorina calls this the "ceteris paribus" aspect of rational
choice models, one which (he says) critics fail to appreciate:
Mancur Olson's... theory of collective action is widely misinterpreted. It
does not predict that ... no individual would join such a group in the
absence of selective incentives .... Rather, Olson's theory predicts thatceteris paribus-itwill be more difficult to organize groups for broad, general purposes than for narrow, special purposes .... Olson's theory makes
no absolute or "point" prediction of zero participation. It predicts relative
differences ....
Fiorina, supra note 68, at 88.
87
See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert, Lowi's Critique of PoliticalScience: A Response, 26 POL. ScI.
& POL. 196 (1993) (extolling this virtue).
88 For an interesting discussion of these differences between norms of legal analysis
and social science inquiry, see Steven D. Smith, Believing like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1041
(1999).
89 1 reach this conclusion for many of the reasons others have offered. Not only do I
agree with Ferejohn and Satz's argument that we should "privilege" explanations that are
based upon intentional or purposive human behavior, Ferejohn & Satz, supra note 76, at
78-83, I also find that the tools of public choice help me think precisely about these phenomena. In particular, they illuminate the incentives facing goal-oriented actors. And so I
find appealing Glen Robinson's thoughtfully skeptical reaction to public choice: "I find
this perspective always interesting, frequently provocative, and sometimes useful. I find
very dubious many of the scientific pretensions made for it by its more ardent exponents,
but in political science, as in social science generally, the 'science' component must be
taken cum grano salis." GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY. PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAw 2 (1991).
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II
A PuBLic CHOICE CASE FOR THE ADMINISTRATiVE
STATE, CONTINUED

For all their recent attention to policy goals and other, broader
human motives, most public choice models continue to frame the delegation issue as "the delegation problem." That is, they promote a
cynical view of agency autonomy by posing a false choice: agencies
may be faithful to their democratically elected overseers, thereby producing good government, or they may shirk, producing bad government.90 Does public choice scholarship imply this cynical view of
agency autonomy? In A Public Choice Casefor the Administrative State,91
Frank Cross and I argued that the answer to that question is "no," and
that public choice offers good reasons for delegating policymaking
decisions to agencies.
Specifically, we tried to tackle head-on the concern about special
interest influence that is so prevalent in the public choice literature by
placing voter preferences at the center of our analysis. We began with
the proposition that voters want government to choose the policies
that they would choose if they could devote the time and resources
necessary to make an informed choice. 92 We posited this goal for at
least two reasons. It is an approach taken by other economic models
of the delegation process. 93 Furthermore, while some public choice
scholars would deny the existence of any "best" policy,9 4 we chose the
well-informed preferences of the median voter as both the next best
alternative within the public choice paradigm, and an idea with roots
in Madisonian democratic theory as well.9 5 Because public choice
90

See, e.g., NISKANEN, supra note 35; McCubbins et al., supra note 59.
91 Spence & Cross, supra note 1.
92 Specifically, we constructed a model in which the best decision is the one that
comes closest to the fully informed preferences of the median voter. This is a Burkean
view of policymaking-one that distinguishes between the immediate policy preferences of
rationally ignorant voters and the policies those voters would want if they had information
and the time to deliberate. We argued that voters prefer policy choices that are consistent
with their fully informed preferences. Id. at 106-09.
93 See Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Learningfrom Oversight: FireAlarms and
Police PatrolsReconstructed, 10J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 96 (1994) (asking whether politicians
'may be able to rely on the bureaucracy to formulate policies that they themselves would
have formulated if they had spent the time and resources necessary to acquire the bureaucracy's level of expertise").
94 That is, some would argue that Arrow's Theorem stands for the proposition that no
decision rule can claim superior democratic legitimacy. See ARRoW, supra note 37.
95 Since our aim was to address public choice theory on its own terms, we accepted
the classically liberal view of politics and government employed by both public choice and
Madison, implicitly rejectingJeffersonian notions of participatory democracy. The goal of
producing policies favored by the well-informed median voter was our proxy for Madison's
preference for a system that would respond to the community's permanent interests rather
than the passions of factions. See Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 102-06, for a more
complete discussion of this issue.
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models of the policy process have highlighted the ways minority factions exert disproportionate influence in the policy process, we
thought it would be interesting to use public choice methods to evaluate delegation against this goal of satisfying the well-informed median
96
voter.
We then constructed a simple formal model to analyze the hypothetical question of which policymaker-elected politicians or the relevant administrative agency-is more likely to produce policy choices
that satisfy that goal. We concluded that under certain circumstances,
voters may have good reasons to believe that the agency will produce a
more representative policy choice, suggesting that a strict nondelegation doctrine does not necessarily make policymaking more democratic. 9 7 Why are agencies often better agents? One reason is that
agencies usually have better information about the policy choice in
question; and since information is one of the determinants of policy
preferences, voters may conclude that those information advantages
make the agency the better agent. Another reason is that electoral
accountability does not imply faithfulness to the median voter's preferences; to the contrary, we argued that electoral accountability can
lead politicians' policy choices away from the median voter's preferences in systematic ways. Agencies, insulated as they are from direct
electoral accountability but nevertheless indirectly accountable, can
produce policy choices that are both more predictable and less susceptible to deviation from voters' wishes.
Thus, ours was essentially a neo-Progressive defense of agency
policymaking in that it emphasized the benefits of information, expertise, and deliberation in the absence of direct electoral accountability.
Do those Progressive virtues necessarily imply the kind of naive view of
agency policymaking that we commonly associate with the Progressives? I think not, and I will use this Part to elaborate upon that claim,
and to further explore the ways in which electoral accountability
makes policymaking by elected politicians riskier-that is, more amenable to interest group manipulation-than policymaking by an
agency. Once again, the language and methods of public choice anal-

96 Unlike some other public choice models, ours did not ignore the issue of "the
endogeneity of preferences," the influence of politicians and political processes on voters'
preferences. See id. at 112-28; see also infra Part II.C (further discussing this proposition).
97 Bureaucratic politics scholars have advanced similar views in the past, though never
in public choice terms. See, e.g.,JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION (1986); Kenneth

J. Meier, RepresentativeBureaucracy:A Theoretical and EmpiricalExposition, 2 REs. PuB. ADMIN.
1 (1993) (summarizing this literature).
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ysis seem to me (intuitively, I'll admit) a useful way of illustrating these
points.98
A.

Centrifugal Forces in the Legislative Process

While Arrow's Theorem demonstrated some of the ways in which
group decisionmaking is undemocratic, 99 different decision processes
are undemocratic in different ways. Certainly legislatures can produce policy choices that bear little relationship to their constituents'
preferences, for a variety of well-understood reasons.
1. Simple Model of Legislative Choice
Assume that voters face the choice of whether to delegate a policy
choice to their elected representatives or to an unelected administrative agency. If voters want the policymaker to make the policy choices
they would make, the voters must evaluate the legislature as a possible
policymaking agent with that goal in mind. That is, they must try to
predict the range of possible outcomes in the event the legislature
makes the decision. To simplify the analysis, assume a unicameral legislature consisting of seven members, four in the majority party and
three in the minority party. Assume further that voters want their legislators to represent their interests by voting consistent with their constituents' preferences. 10 0 Next assume that the members of the
legislature are rational utility-maximizers, and that their utility functions include both policy goals' 01 and the desire to protect and en98 I will look first at an idealized legislative process, one in which legislators are perfectly representative of their constituents. That way, we can see how legislative choice can
be undemocratic even under those conditions. By adding greater complexity, we can see
additional ways in which the process can produce outcomes that seem unfair or suboptimal.
99 That is, no such process can simultaneously satisfy five necessary (or desirable)
conditions of democratic decisionmaking. For good summaries of Arrow's conditions and
the logic of his proof, see NoRMAn FROHLICH &JOE A OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 19-31 (Robert A. Dahl ed., 1978).
100 In our earlier analysis, we assumed that voters want government policymakers to act
as trustees who represent them not by responding to their current preferences, but rather
by pursuing policies that represent the median voter's hypothetical, fully informed preferences. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Of course, agencies are more fully informed than politicians about the issue in question. However, we can ignore agencies'
information advantages for the time being by assuming that all the constituent and voter
ideal points correspond to the voters' fully informed preferences. Indeed, this model illustrates the potential dangers of legislative policymaking, regardless of whether we assume
that legislators' ideal points represent voters' uninformed or fully informed preferences.
101 So as to set aside the issue of conflict between constituent preferences and the
legislators' personal policy preferences, I assume here that the legislators' policy preferences correspond perfectly with their median constituent's preferences on every issue, see
infra note 104; hence, there is no discrepancy between the goal of serving constituents'
interests and making good policy. Thus, I assume instrumental rationality, but equate personal maximizing behavior with duty, by equating constituent and legislator policy goals. It
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hance their job security. 102 Other than these, I make no other
assumptions here about the considerations that dominate legislators'
voting decisions. Figure 2 represents one potential breakdown of the
ideal points of such a legislature,10 3 where individual legislators' ideal
10 4
points correspond perfectly to their constituents' preferences.
FIGURE
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Assume further that:
Di = the representative ideal point 0 5 of Democratic legislator i
A-= the representative ideal point of Republican legislator i.
V= the ideal point of the median voter and the representative ideal
10 6
point of the median legislator.
DMDN = the median policy alternative among Democratic legislators.
RmDN = the median policy alternative among Republican legislators.
IB = the ideal point of the relevant liberal interest group.
'CONS

= the ideal point of the relevant conservative interest group.

The argument for a strong nondelegation doctrine rests in part
on the notion that forcing legislators to make policy choices will tend
to produce policies nearer to point Vthan if agencies make those policy choices. However, that conclusion follows only under particular
should become evident that this assumption actually overstates legislatures' tendency to
produce representative policy choices.
102
Consistent with the discussion in Part I.C, this assumption reflects my intuition that
legislators often act purposefully and instrumentally with these goals in mind.
103 As always, in Figure 2 all the points on the line represent policy alternatives in a
policy space. Assume that legislators' individual preferences are single-peaked: each legislator prefers the policy at her ideal point, and her preferences over other alternatives are a
direct function of the distance those alternatives lie from her ideal point in either
direction.
104
By assuming that legislators' ideal points match their median constituents' ideal
points, I remove one of the incentives for legislators to deviate from their constituents'
wishes. I do so to illustrate some of the other reasons why this happens.
105
By representative ideal point, I mean the ideal point of that legislator's median
constituent.
106
Obviously, if each voter's vote carried the same weight (i.e., each district was exactly
the same size), then Vwould represent the ideal point of both the median legislator and
the median voter.
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conditions. That is, the electoral connection ensures that legislators
will choose policy V only when the legislators perceive the vote as one
that entails electoral risk.
Political scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to the
notion of electoral risk. Richard Fenno distinguished between the
representative's "geographical constituency" and her "reelection constituency." 0 7 Of course, it is the latter to which the legislator must
attend to preserve herjob, 08 and it is the legislator's relationship with
the latter on which so many political scientists focus their attention.
Many have concluded that constituents make voting decisions based
upon retrospective evaluations of candidates' performance in office.' 0 9 Legislators know this, but they also know that voters are rationally ignorant"0 about many aspects of that performance. Further,
legislators know that different members of the reelection constituency
have different preference intensities over certain issues. Thus, for
each voting decision a legislator faces, she must try to anticipate the
consequences of her action alternatives."' That calculation, in turn,
will depend upon: (1) characteristics of the policy choice itself, and
"traceability" of unfavorable outcomes resulting from the vote;"

2

and

(2) characteristics of the legislator, such as the safety of the legislator's
seat and the reservoir of trust-or leeway 3 -that the legislator has
developed among her reelection constituency. Thus, we can conceive
of electoral risk as a function of the following:
" The legislator's perception of how salient the issue is to voters,
and how likely it is that voters will become aware of the legislator's
n
choice; 14

" The electoral vulnerability of the legislator (safe versus marginal
seat); and
107 RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME ST=L: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DisTmRrs 8 (1978);
see alsoGARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 60-63 (2d ed. 1987)
(describing the central task of congressional candidates: to decide which parts of a heterogeneous constituency to write off and which to court, and how to reach the latter group).
108 To the extent that this proposition is true, of course, the model represented by
Figure 2 overstates the legislator's tendency to represent the geographical constituency.
109 SeeR. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); WILLIAM T.
BIANCo, TRUSr. REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSTITUENTS (John E. Jackson & Christopher H.
Acher eds., 1994); MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
110 See ANrHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207-19, 237 (1957).
111 Arnold notes that a vote can rouse the "activated public," a risk to which legislators
must constantly attend. See ARNOLD, supra note 109, at 60-63.
112 For a discussion of this issue, see id. at 48-51.

113 BLANCO, supranote 109, at 106-18.
114 The term "salient" is sometimes used in ways that conflate the notions of voter
awareness and preference intensity, as in the sentence "Abortion policy is highly salient to
right-to-life organizations." I will use the term to refer to the level of current or likely
future voter awareness of an issue or policy choice. I use the term "preference intensity" to
refer to the issue of how much voters care about the issue.
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0 The legislator's perception of voters' preference intensity-that is,
the importance of the issue to voters relative to other issues on
which the legislator has taken a position. 115
Electoral risk, when present, should discipline the legislators to
produce a policy that represents the voters' wishes. More specifically,
in Figure 2, if electoral risk is present for every legislator, and no party
or committee controls the agenda (so that any alternative may be proposed for a vote against any other alternative), then the legislature
should produce policy V,1 16 no matter what the status quo ante. This
is, of course, because V, the policy favored by the median voter, will
command a majority against any other proposal in the policy space.
2.

Varying Electoral Risk

However, when one or more legislators face no electoral risk, the
result may be a policy choice that does not reflect the median voter's
preferences. Of course, there are lots of reasons why some votes do
not entail electoral risk for some legislators. Legislators may know
that voters are likely to remain unaware of the policy choice they
make because it concerns an obscure issue. Legislators may believe
that while voters are aware of the issue, voters do not care enough
about the issue for the choice to produce electoral risk. Alternatively,
for legislators holding safe seats, even votes on salient issues about
which some constituents have strong preferences will not entail electoral risk because their safe seats afford them the luxury of losing some
support without losing their seats in the legislature.
When a vote does not entail electoral risk, legislators may not be
guided by their constituents' wishes. To the contrary, in such cases
legislators face temptations to deviate from voters' wishes in ways that
agencies do not. If the policy choice represented by Figure 2 does not
entail electoral risk for a legislator, that legislator faces a choice
among three possibilities: (1) she can pursue her constituents' preferences by seeking a policy at her ideal point; (2) she can pursue her
electoral goals at the expense of her median constituents' preferences
by voting to serve the interests of powerful interest groups; or (3) she
can trade her vote on this low-risk policy choice for support on other
115 Even when an issue is salient or the legislator's seat is not safe, constituents might
not care deeply enough about the issue to change their votes.
116 Every legislator will seek a policy at his or her sincere ideal point because the vote

entails electoral risk. Since V represents the ideal point of the median voter in the
ture, it will defeat any alternative offered against it. For example, assume the policy
is under active consideration on the floor of the legislature. Anyone proposing to
the bill to include the policy at point Vwill be successful because all the Democrats
will vote for the amendment, which produces a result closer to their ideal points.

legislaat RIID.D
amend
plus RI
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issues about which she and her constituents care more. 117 By definition, for these low-risk issues, the legislator can do any of these things
without fear of electoral consequences." 8 If she chooses any but the
first option, she will change the location of the median policy. Note
that only one of these options is inconsistent with idealized notions of
representation: most legislators would be unapologetic about trading
a loss on an issue about which her constituents care little for a gain on
an issue about which they care deeply. However, both of these
courses of action exert powerful centrifugal forces on the legislature's
ultimate policy choice.
For example, assume that D, (and only DI) perceived no electoral
risk in this policy choice. Perhaps she holds a very safe seat, or her
constituents do not-and never will-know or care about this issue.
D, is free to use her vote to benefit a powerful interest group, if she
thinks that doing so might enhance her reelection prospects (for example, by attracting future campaign contributions or muting the intensity of their future opposition). If that powerful interest group is
IcoNs, then the new median policy choice is R2's ideal point." 9 Likewise, D, is free to trade her vote on this issue for another member's
support on a future issue. If she trades with R3 or R4, then R2 is once
again the new median policy. More generally, if any legislator facing
no electoral risk decides to trade votes or satisfy constituents on the
opposite side of her ideal point from V, she moves the median policy
alternative (and, therefore, the ultimate policy choice) away from her
(and her constituents') sincere ideal point. As more legislators perceive an absence of electoral risk, more have the opportunity to en-

117

The latter two options do not directly violate Arrow's conditions for democratic

choice because Arrow was concerned only with decisionmaking within a group, rather than
group members' actions as representatives of other constituencies. Nevertheless, both options may reduce the representativeness of the ultimate decision. The third option, vote
trading, does violate Arrow's "independence" condition, and one might argue that the
second option does so indirectly as well, in that the legislator's vote is influenced by considerations other than her preferences over the policy issue in question. The independence
condition states that the collective choice should be based only on the group members'
preferences over the issue in question, and should be independent of irrelevant
alternatives.
118
Of course, under the first option, it is possible that a legislator's own policy preferences might better "represent" voters if those voters were to hold the same view given more
information about the policy choice in question. Indeed, in Spence & Cross, supra note 1,
we argued that agencies sometimes produced more representative decisions because of
their greater expertise and information.
119 When D, votes as if her ideal point were lco., then R 2, R3 , DI, and R 4 will support
the policy at R 2 against any policy alternative to the left of R 2; D 2 , )3, R 1, and R 2 will support
R, against any policy to the right of R2. Thus, when legislators can freely amend legislation
on the floor, they should produce alternative R2 under this scenario.
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gage in that kind of behavior, with the possible result that the
resulting median policy choice will lie even further from V 120
Of course, the absence of electoral risk enables legislators to look
beyond the immediate (unidimensional) policy choice and to translate their votes into valuable currency (in other policy dimensions).
Thus, popular legislation may be opposed not only by legislators
whose constituents oppose it, but by some whose lack of electoral risk
allows them to withhold support strategically, in order to secure desired changes in the bill or support from other legislators on other
bills. As a result, legislative decisionmaking moves further from the
wishes of the median voter, and creates the opportunity for legislative
amalgams of minority-favored provisions to become law (i.e., pork-barrel legislation).
3.

IntroducingAgenda Control

What if legislators cannot freely propose policy alternatives for a
floor vote? What if, instead, the party or a committee controls which
proposals make it to the floor for a vote? If the party or a committee
exerts control over the agenda, the result can be a policy choice that
deviates from V, depending upon the location of the status quo policy.
This is true even if all members face electoralrisk.
Assume that the party or a committee can control which alternatives are considered on the floor of the legislature. 12 1 If the status quo
is at R4 and the Republican leadership proposes a policy at RIDN, that
policy will command the votes of all the legislators except R 4 (because
for those legislators, RuDN is closer to their own ideal points than is the
status quo, R4). 1 2 2 Alternatively, a committee composed of ideological
outliers with gatekeeping power could exert this same sort of control
120 It is not difficult to see how the legislature's policy choice can stray further from
point Vwhen more legislators are free of electoral risk. If three of the members to the left
of Ico,,face no electoral risk on a policy choice, and are persuaded to vote Ico', preferences
(say PL3, R 2, and R1), Icov becomes the new median policy choice. Likewise, if D2, D3, and R,
face no electoral risk on a vote and decide to vote with IuB on the issue in question, IuB
becomes the new median policy choice.
121 Of course, this could be accomplished through the imposition of a closed rule
during floor debate, prohibiting amendments (including an amendment consisting of proposal V. In this way, parties or committees can limit legislative alternatives to two: the
proposal and the status quo.
122 If we think of Figure 2 as an ideological spectrum, RBis a very conservative status
quo policy (say, the absence of regulation, where moving left in the policy space denotes
increasingly stringent regulation). If the members of the Republican caucus vote to select
the policy that will be considered on the floor and impose a closed rule (prohibiting
amendments), the Republicans can propose any policy to the left of 1 4, say B&w.v, and still
command the votes of a majority of legislators on the floor, even if all legislators vote
sincerely in the floor vote. How? In the caucus vote, R, R2, and R3 will prefer the policy at
! o,v to the status quo (the policy at R); and when R,%foNis pitted against the policy at R4 on
the floor, it will command the votes of all the legislators except R4. In fact, the true median
Republican position in this caucus vote lies to the left of /fDN. Since three votes constitute
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over the agenda. For example, if the status quo is at R4, a liberal committee composed of D, and D 2 could command a majority for any alternative that lies closer to R, than the status quo (R4). In that
instance, the gatekeeping committee could secure a change in policy
123
from R4 to D2, for example.
What happens if the status quo policy lies to the left of the majority party's preferred policy but to the right of V (at, say, R2)? In that
instance the party could use its ability to control the agenda to preserve the status quo by refusing to report a bill to the floor, since a
majority of the party prefer the status quo to any alternative that
would command a full legislative majority. Alternatively, if the status
quo is to the left of V, the party may propose policy V, which will pass
24
with the support of all the Republicans.1
When we relax the assumption of electoral risk for all members,
the opportunities for producing a policy that deviates from Vincrease.
Assume once again a status quo at R2. If legislator R1 and at least one
Democrat (say, )3) face no electoral risk, they have the option of cooperating with the remaining Republicans to control the agenda and
secure passage of some policy to the right of R 2; that policy could be
R,foN, IcoNs, R3, or any policy that lies no further from R3 than R 2
does.' 2 5 Suppose instead that the status quo is at or to the left of V In
that case, there are many alternatives to the right of Vthat a majority
of Republicans will prefer. In that case, if there is one member (any
one member) to the left of R2 who faces no electoral risk, that
electorally safe member may choose to cooperate with the Republican
party members toward the passage of a policy at, say, R 3. That is, R 2,
R3, and R 4 can control the agenda, knowing that the fourth electorally
safe member's vote will be sufficient to pass their preferred alternative, R3, when it gets to the floor. One might imagine situations in
which a member of the minority party who faces no electoral risk on a
particular policy choice might engage in that sort of cooperation in
12 6
return for support on some later policy choice.
a majority of this caucus, any policy that lies closer to R2 than does R 4 will command that

majority.

This assumes committee gatekeeping and a closed rule on the floor.
One might think of this kind of agenda control as a violation of another of Arrow's
conditions of democratic choice because it involves restricting the domain of choice and
prevents the group from considering particular policy alternatives at particular stages of
the process.
125 This is because P, will prefer any alternative to the right of R 2, and 13,will prefer
any alternative that is closer to her ideal point than is the status quo, including some policies to her right. The two electorally safe legislators can cooperate with R3 toward that
goal.
126 There is one possible recent example: some have speculated that Senator Russell
Feingold's vote to confirm John Ashcroft as Attorney General represented a unilateral offer to trade his vote for any Republican votes on his campaign finance bill.
123

124
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We can expect legislators to engage in this course of conduct
without ascribing cynical motives to them. A vote that entails no electoral risk is a valuable asset, one that legislators can use to achieve
valued policy goals (as in vote trading) or to enhance their job security (by catering to the wishes of a particular interest group). On some
level, voters know that legislative policy choice is inherently unstable
in this way, and not because legislators are corrupt or beholden to
special interests. Rather, because electoral risk varies among legislators and policy choices, there are opportunities for well-meaning and
not-so-well-meaning legislators alike to vote in ways that deviate from
the wishes of their median constituents. When that happens, legislative policymaking can result in unrepresentative policy choices.
4.

A Hypothetical Example

How often is real legislative policymaking distorted in these ways?
Political scientists seem split on this question, 127 and given the complexity and uncertainty of the real legislative decisionmaking environment, it is difficult to prove whether or how frequently these dynamics
affect real legislative decisions. Like other public choice analyses, the
relevance of this one is in the eye of the beholder.

127
GaryJacobson reasons that while legislators pursue the twin goals of governing and
seeking reelection, they feel the cost of neglecting the latter goal far more acutely than
they feel the cost of neglecting the former. The way they attend to reelection is by spreading around the pork: something for everyone is more important than objective good sense.
SeeJACoBSON, supra note 107, at 119-25. Other political scientists go so far as to argue that
Congress is organized to facilitate the production of these gains from trade. See Barry R.
Weingast & William J. Marshall, The IndustrialOrganization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures,
like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96J. POL. ECON. 132, 143-48 (1988) (arguing that
the committee system in Congress confers "property rights" to the control of policy to
"high-demanders"-legislators whose preference intensities are higher for the issues within
the committee's jurisdiction, and who tend to be ideological oufliers). We need look no
further than recent sessions of Congress to find examples of attempts (some of them successful) to secure passage of unpopular policies by adding them to popular legislation.
One such set of examples is the use of non-germane environmental "riders" by recent
Republican Congresses, the most infamous and successful of which was the so-called
"Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program." That rider, which permitted logging in oldgrowth forests over environmental groups' objections, was attached as a rider to a popular
budget bill. See H.R. 1158, 104th Cong. § 2001 (1995). The Defenders of Wildlife maintains a list of more recent environmental riders on its website. See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL
RIDERS,
at http://wwv.defenders.org/wildlife/riders/riders.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2001). For further analysis of legislative choice in the context of
multidimensional policy choices, see infra Part II.A.4. Other political scientists, like Keith
Krehbiel, believe that analyses like Wiengast and Marshall's overstate the problem. See
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991) (arguing instead
that Congress is organized to provide members with information, and serves the interests
not of outliers, but of the median member).
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Consider, however, the following plausible hypothetical. 128 Portions of the 1990 Amendments 129 to the Clean Air Act 130 focused on

the need to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions from fossil-fueled
power plants. Suppose that in 1990 there had been unanimous support for the general notion of mandating reductions, but disagreement over particulars. Suppose further that there was majority
support in the country and in Congress for mandating larger (rather
than smaller) emission reductions, and for allowing regulated plants
to achieve those reductions by switching to cleaner-burning, lowsulphur coal. More specifically, assume that the legislative debate centered on two issues, each with two alternatives:
* On the primary issue of emissions reductions, legislators faced a
choice between option la, mandating larger emissions reductions
(the more stringent option), and option 1b, mandating smaller
reductions (the less stringent option).
* On the secondary issue of how to achieve those reductions, legislators had to choose between option 2a, under which power plant
operators would be free to shift to low-sulphur coal (the flexible
option), and option 2b, which would actively discourage fuel
switching (the inflexible option).
Assume further that legislators' preferences were divided evenly in
thirds as described in Table 2, in which bold type signifies more intense preferences.
TABLE

2

HYPOTHETICAL PREFERENCES OVER ACID RAIN CONTROL ISSUES
Conservatives (1/3)

Liberals (1/3)

lb 2a

la 2a

Eastern Coal
Representatives (1/3)

la 2b

In this situation, despite majority support for larger emissions reductions and for allowing fuel switching (two-thirds support in both
instances), it is easy to see how vote trading xl3 could produce a statute
calling for smaller reductions (option 1b) and inflexibility on fuel
switching (option 2b). Eastern Coal representatives might withhold
128
Since discussions of the Clean Air Act figure so prominently in discussions of delegation, I opted for a Clean Air Act hypothetical. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, PublicInterested
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. L. REv. 7 (2000); Farina, supra note 5; Schoenbrod, Growing Up,
supra note 54. It is offered unapologetically as merely a plausible scenario, not a description of historical reality.
129
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 1676.
130 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
131
As in the analysis of Figure 2, either vote trading or legislators' decisions to serve
the interests of unrepresentative interest groups can yield similar results.
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their support for larger reductions in return for conservatives' support
8l 2
for inflexibility. Each group would gain utility from such a trade,
and the two less popular policy options would become law with two1 33
thirds of the vote in each case.
Indeed, decisionmaking grows more unstable when legislators
must vote on two or more issues simultaneously, even in the absence
of agenda control and in the presence of electoral risk. Table 3 below
details the legislators' preferences over all the possible combinations
that could be included in the legislation, based upon the preference
intensities described in Table 2.134 These legislative alternatives assume: (1) that all legislators face electoral risk (and, therefore, vote
sincerely and avoid vote trading); and (2) that legislators must address
the primary issue,13 5 the stringency of pollution control reductions,
but have the option of delegating the secondary issue, fuel switching,
to the agency. Of course, the secondary issue cannot be considered in
legislation alone. Given this set of preferences, we can examine how
the various alternatives perform in pairwise comparisons (head-tohead votes). 136 It is evident from Table 3 that when issues are considered simultaneously, differences in preference intensity alone allow
alternative lb 2b (the less stringent, less flexible alternative) to defeat
alternative la 2a (the more stringent, more flexible alternative), even
without vote trading. 137 This is true even though majorities prefer
more stringent sulphur dioxide reductions and fuel-switching
flexibility.
132

In this instance, differences in issue salience make the electoral risk of deviating

from voters' wishes on the low-salience issue minimal, particularly if the trade is made to

secure a better result on the high-salience issue.
133

To make this agreement hold, the contracting parties would have to agree to vote

together on any and all attempts to amend the lb 2b legislation.
134
This set of preference orderings assumes that each group of voters values their

ideal combination of policies (from Table 2) most highly. After that, each prefers legislation that includes their high-intensity preference alone (that option only exists for liberals
and conservatives), followed by the combination representing their preferred policy on the
high-intensity issue plus their less-preferred alternative for the low-intensity issue. After
that, each group prefers first to avoid the unwanted outcome on the high-intensity issue,
and to obtain (where possible) the preferred option on the low-intensity issue. For liberals
and conservatives, this means that their next-preferred policies couple their preferred policy on the low-intensity issue with the less-preferred option on the high-intensity issue
(which is unavoidable), followed by the low-intensity issue preferred policy alone. For the
Eastern Coal representatives, they prefer legislation that does not address the fuel switching at all to legislation that includes the flexibility option (2b). For all three groups, their
least-preferred policy combines both less-preferred policy options. Note that across these
two dimensions, preferences are not single-peaked.
135 In other words, assume that on the major issue-sulphur dioxide reductions-the
no-action alternative is not a viable option for any legislator.
136 See the Appendix for the full results of pairwise voting.
137 This is because both the conservatives and Eastern Coal Representatives prefer this
combination over the liberals' preferred combination.
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TABLE 3
HYPOTHETICAL PREFERENCES OVER ALL POSSIBLE COM:BINATIONS
Eastern Coal
Liberals (1/3)
Conservatives (1/3)
Representatives (1/3)
lb 2a

la 2a

la 2b

lb

la

lb 2b

lb 2b

la 2b

la

la 2a

lb 2a

lb

la

lb

la 2a

la 2b

lb 2b

lb 2a

More generally, there is no Condorcet winner here; no alternative defeats all of the other alternatives. For example, while lb 2b
would defeat la 2a in a pairwise vote (because the conservatives and
Eastern Coal representatives would favor it), the lb 2b alternative itself
is vulnerable. Liberals and conservatives would support an amendment to permit fuel switching (producing alternative lb 2a), or an
amendment to delegate that issue to the agency to decide (producing
alternative 1b). In fact, absent agenda control limiting the amendment process, the process of amending this bill could cycle indefinitely.' 38 Furthermore, while agenda control will eliminate cycling,
those who control the agenda can use it to produce any of these legislative outcomes.' 3 9 If the leadership prefers the more stringent and
more flexible policies, it can produce the la 2a outcome by controlling the number of amendment opportunities and the order in which
amendments are considered. 140 Unfortunately, however, the leadership could also use this procedure to produce the opposite outcome,
enacting the less stringent, less flexible policies (lb 2b).141 The routes
to these results are detailed in the Appendix.
Of course, one might question how frequently situations like this
arise. How often do leaders try to defeat majority preferences in this
way? How often will legislators sit idly by and allow themselves to be
manipulated by the leadership in this way? The former question is an
empirical one, about which we could expect disagreement. One
might surmise that the Republican leadership in the Senate has tried
to defeat a majority that favors the McCain-Feingold campaign fiFor an explanation of how that might occur, see the Appendix.
See the Appendix for a description of how agenda control could be used to produce several possible outcomes.
140 See the Appendix for examples of how the agenda can be manipulated to produce
this result given any of the other alternatives as a starting point.
141
See the Appendix for an explanation of why this is possible.
1S8

139
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nance bill, 142 and that they do so by controlling the agenda in these
very ways. On the latter issue, it is true that legislators may try to vote
strategically to defeat this kind of agenda manipulation. However,
given the inherent instability of a situation like this Clean Air Act hypothetical, it would take an extraordinarily persistent and united
group of strategic voters to produce a bill containing the two majoritypreferred policies (the more stringent, more flexible policies, la 2a)
absent the cooperation of the leadership. Indeed, delegation to the
agency might be an attractive alternative in that situation.
B.

Centripetal Forces in the Agency Policymaking Process

Now compare the voters' view of the agency as a potential policymaking delegate. Progressives attributed more selfless motives to
bureaucrats than politicians, arguing that the former are less susceptible to the influence of private interests, less likely to be instrumentally
rational in the pursuit of personal goals, and more likely to be guided
by norms of duty and the like. But even if we make identical assumptions about the motives of agency bureaucrats and legislators, there
are nevertheless good reasons for the median voter to prefer agency
policymaking.

143

Scholars of all stripes have long recognized that delegation to
agencies is one way legislators "solve" some of the choice problems
inherent in the legislative process. Cycling and agenda manipulation
can paralyze the legislative process, and delegating important decisions to agencies can yield a decision when one would not otherwise
be made. Of course, delegation can produce a policy choice when a
legislative majority exists in favor of a general policy but not a specific
one. Legislators may agree that the status quo must be changed, but
cannot agree on exactly how. Slender majorities of both houses of
Congress may favor legislation aimed at a new policy goal, but different subsets of those slender majorities may oppose some of the particulars in each potential approach to achieving that goal. Alternatively,
142
Opponents first tried to filibuster, and then decided to facilitate, the addition of
"killer amendments" to the bill. See Matthew Tulley, Riders to Tell if Campaign FinanceBill
FlRies or Dies, 59 CONG. Q. WiuxL. REp. 513, 522 (2001) ("'They'll try and kill it with poison
pills,' [Senator] McCain said warily."). Referring to the House counterpart, the ShaysMeehan bill, a New York Times editorial said: "Today we urge lawmakers to watch out for
another danger, which is the effort by opponents to try amending the bill to death." Editorial, Reform's "KillerAmendments," N.Y. Tims, July 10, 2001, at A18.
143
In Spence & Cross, supra note 1, we focused on the values that guide policymakers'
decisions, arguing that the values that guide politicians' decisions are more likely than
those that guide agencies' decisions to deviate from voters' values. Our focus was on the
operative values-those that were determinative in policy decisions. We did not argue that
bureaucrats were more selfless than politicians, only that the absence of electoral pressures
provided bureaucrats with fewer incentives to deviate from the goal of pursuing policy
goals that matched the well-informed preferences of the median voter. See id. at 123-28.
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legislators may agree on the general goal but are cycling on one of the
particulars in a bill.144 Rather than limit alternatives in order to produce a choice, legislators may instead decide to delegate the choice to
an agency.
But is delegation really a solution to these problems? Arrow's
Theorem and the other formal analyses of collective choice problems
are general and, by their terms, applicable to any collective choice
setting. Agency policymaking only "solves" these problems by violating the conditions of democratic choice on which those theorems are
based. 145 In a variety of more or less formal ways, agency decisionmaking certainly violates some of Arrow's assumptions; 1 46 however, it
does so in ways that are less susceptible to the kind of manipulation by
minority factions that can infect legislative decisionmaking. 147
Whereas the legislative process produces centrifugal forces that push
policy choice away from the center, agency policymaking is characterized by a kind of centripetal force that prevents individual policy
choices from straying too far from the agency's core mission.
1. Narrowing the Range of Choice
Delegation narrows the range of policy alternatives considered in
several ways. First, agencies are hierarchical, and hierarchical organization narrows the range of operative preferences in agency decisionmaking. While most agency decisions are produced with input from a
vide variety of agency members and nonmembers, not all opinions
carry equal weight. In executive agencies, a single cabinet secretary or
144
One way cycling may occur is if there are three alternative proposals for inclusion
in a bill (a, b, and c), and legislators' preferences are as follows:
" one-third prefer a to b, and b to ;
" one-third prefer b to c and c to a; and
" one-third prefer c to a, and a to b.
Note that in this hypothetical, preferences are not single-peaked, as they are stipulated to
be in spatial models. In other words, we cannot arrange these three choice alternatives in
single-dimensional Euclidean space so that these three groups' policy preferences are single-peaked. In these circumstances, when the legislation can be freely amended, legislators
will continue to amend it indefinitely, because there will always be a two-thirds majority in
favor of a change. That is, two-thirds of the legislators prefer c to a, a to b, and b to c. Note
that if the party controls the agenda, it can decide which of these minority-preferred policies will make its way into the bill.
145
In particular, Arrow's Theorem assumed, among other things, the need for a decision process that (1) did not restrict the range of choice alternatives (Arrow's so-called
"unrestricted domain" requirement), and (2) did not allow any one member of the decisionmaking group to act as a dictator (the "nondictatorship" requirement). Agency decisionmaking routinely violates both of these Arrovian conditions.
146
Of course, legislative decision processes often restrict the domain of choice in various ways. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational
Choice Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131 (1989) (discussing "structure-induced equilibrium" in legislative choice); see also supra Part II.A (describing how manipulation of the
legislative process can pull the policy choice away from the median voter's preferences).
See supra Part IIA.
147
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agency administrator has the power to take decisive action, eliminating the problem of cycling and the paralysis it can cause. In an independent commission headed by a plural executive, cycling remains a
possibility; however, the agency may not have the luxury of the noaction alternative in that instance. Statutes and courts often compel
agencies to act, preventing cycling from producing paralysis.
Second, the range of preferences among agency bureaucrats will
be relatively narrow in any event, because the agency will be populated by those who would be attracted to the agency's mission. If the
median voter's ideal point lies within that range, delegation to the
agency may be less risky from the median voter's point of view, in that
it is less likely to produce an outlier policy. Indeed, many public
choice models of delegation are cognizant of the importance of mission orientation in the delegation process. Some public choice scholars argue that legislators steer agencies toward particular outcomes by
defining the agency's mission in this way.1 48 Other models of legislative delegation assume that legislators take the distribution of preferences within the agency into account when deciding how much
discretion to grant agency decisionmakers.1 4 9 In any case, because
legislators do not necessarily share the agency's mission orientation,
the distribution of preferences among agency members is likely to be
considerably narrower than it is among legislators, effectively narrow150
ing the range of possible outcomes.
148
See Bawn, supra note 56 (making the same argument); McCubbins et al., supra note
59 (describing these "structural" controls over agency action); Spence, supra note 59 (finding some empirical support for the notion that agencies adhere to their statutory
missions).
149
Bawn, supra note 56, and Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 56, both discuss this
facet of the delegation decision.
150
Regardless of the distribution of preferences within the agency, the agency's range
of choice is narrower than that of Congress. As a general matter, judicial review limits the
range of choice to the agency's statutory mandate, however broad or vague that mandate
may be. One could argue that ifjudges are mere policy-maximizers who impose their own
policy preferences when reviewing agency action, then judicial review does not narrow the
range of choice because judges' preferences may be as widely dispersed as legislators' preferences. However, even if judges try to maximize their policy preferences, they are more
constrained in doing so when reviewing agency actions. While courts insist that both Congress and agencies act constitutionally, existing statutes do not constrain congressional
choice the way they constrain agency choice, making the range of possible outcomes
greater in the former setting. If we assume that judges do try to keep agencies within the
broad boundaries of their statutory mandates, then judicial review does limit agency action. Of course, the larger, empirical question of what motivates judges generally is an
especially thorny one, and is addressed by an enormous and complex literature in law and
the social sciences. Many social scientists who study the courts subscribe to the view that
judges are indeed policy-maximizers whose decisions reflect a desire to achieve particular
policy results. Two judicial-politics scholars recently put it this way: "A half century of empirical scholarship has now firmly established that the ideological values and policy preferences of Supreme Courtjustices have a profound impact on their decisions in many cases."

Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Stoy: The Impact ofJustices' Values on
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But is narrowing the range of choice a good thing? The obvious
objection to such a narrowing is as follows: if it is the agency's enabling legislation that effectively limits the range of agency choice (either through bureaucrats' mission orientation or judicial review), how
can we be sure that the enabling legislation itself reflects the median
voter's wishes?' 5 1 How do we know that the delegation was not contaminated by the instability and manipulation described in Part II.A?
Indeed, early public choice models condemned regulation in this very
way, by emphasizing the ways in which rent-seeking interest groups,
congressional committees, and agencies conspire to produce policies
that represent the interests of those outlier groups at the expense of
the median voter's interests. 152 However, the analysis of legislative
choice in Part II.A suggests that while this risk exists, major regulatory
legislation is less likely than other forms of legislative action to stray
53
from the median voter's preferences.
Consider Mancur Olson's argument that smaller, wealthier
groups have resource and organizational advantages that facilitate
Supreme CourtDecision Making, 40 Am. J. POL. ScI. 1049, 1049 (1996). This characterization
of Supreme Court justices' motives has been extended to other judges as well by political
scientists and legal scholars alike. For a good summary of the evolution of the debate
within political science, see Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Slaying the Dragon:Segal, Spaeth and the
Function of Law in Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. Pot. Sci. 1004, 1004-05 (1996).
Many legal scholars share this view as well. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of Appeals, 107 YALE LJ. 2155, 2156 (1998) (much "scholarship simply assumes the sincere application of legal doctrine without considering the possibility that it may at times be nothing
more than a convenient rationalization for political decisionmaking"); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Two Problems in AdministrativeLaw: PoliticalPolarity on the Districtof Columbia Circuit and
JudicialDeterrenceof Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE LJ. 300 (ascribingjudicial decisions primarily to policy preferences of judges).
This view is contrasted with the traditional legal model, which emphasizes interpretive
techniques and legal reasoning as taught in law schools, and reference to higher principles
(for example, stare decisis, constitutional doctrines, and the like) as key decision criteria.
For the classic explication of this view, see, for example, BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921) ("My analysis of the judicial process comes then
to this, and little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of
the law."). For a more recent and circumspect version of the traditional view, arguing that
judges are constrained by these higher duties, see James L. Gibson, Decision Making in
Appellate Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRrrCAL ASSESSMENT 255 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
151 This issue actually comprises two questions: one about the enabling legislation's
consistency with the median voter's wishes when the statute was passed, and another about
the legislation's consistency with the median voter's current wishes. I address the former
issue here. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the latter issue.
152
See Kalt & Zupan, supranote 36; Peltzman, supra note 35; Stigler, supra note 35.
153 Indeed, the stronger objection is the argument that while enabling legislation
often reflects the median voters' preferences at the time of passage, those preferences
change over time, while the agency's mission orientation makes agency preferences resistant to change. Part II.C, infra, addresses this argument.
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rent-seeking in the legislative process.1 54 Olson posed the question of
why, then, Congress sometimes produces major regulatory legislation
that burdens those groups. One commonly accepted answer is that
voters sometimes exercise influence in ways that bypass interest
groups. That is, politicians can help broader, less wealthy, mass interest groups to overcome Olsonian disadvantages, particularly in highersalience policy debates. 155 In debates over the kind of high-salience
issues that produce major regulatory legislation (the kind that establish an agency's general mission), politicians act as political entrepreneurs, recognizing the political benefits of rallying the unorganized
supporters of public interest policy goals. This is the so-called "republican moment" explanation for major regulatory legislation, 156 one
that echoes Anthony Downs's description of the "issue attention cycle"1 57 in the context of environmental law. The analysis in Part II.A
suggests that republican moments ought to produce policies that reflect the median voter's wishes; when an issue captures the public's
imagination, legislators face greater electoral risk and have a strong
disincentive to deviate from their constituents' wishes. 158 The same
cannot be said of the kind of lower-salience, second-order decisions
that legislators often delegate to agencies.
Finally, mission orientation aside, for some kinds of policy
choices, the agency's information and deliberation advantages will
further narrow the range of choices considered in beneficial ways.
For some policy choices, information will be a strong determinant of

154 See supra notes 35, 48 and accompanying text.
155 For general summaries of this literature in the public choice context, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Explanationsfor Environmental
Laws, 1969-73, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 33-56 (1998); and David B. Spence, Paradox
Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundationsof EnvironmentalLaw in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM.J.
ENVTL. L. 145, 168-71 (1995).
156 See Schroeder, supra note 155, at 31 & n.7 (noting, however, that this result may
reflect the kind of legislative deliberation that I have here suggested is rare in Congress).
Politicians can tap into latent public interest groups in an effort to win support and, ultimately, to gain or retain office. In this way, politicians absorb many of the costs of collective action on an issue-by-issue basis. Without incurring any collective action costs beyond
voting, a latent group can exert policy influence through its elected representative. Two
well-known examples include then-Representative Jim Florio's leadership in the passage of
the 1980 Superfund law and Representative Henry Waxman's efforts on behalf of various
clean air initiatives. For detailed discussions of political entrepreneurship, see HARDIN,
supra note 48, at 35-37; see also Taylor, supra note 70, at 223-26 (discussing rational choice

theory).
157 Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-The "Issue-Attention Cycle, "28 PUB. INr.
38 (1972).
158 Of course, the analysis in Part II.A, supra, showed that legislators can deviate from
the median voter's wishes even when issues are salient. But to the extent that salience
tends to push legislative choices closer to the median voter's preferences, this argument
holds.
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preferences, 59 such that the development of greater expertise tends
to cause formerly dispersed preferences to coalesce. 160 In these circumstances, then, agencies ought to be more likely than legislators
(even in the absence of strategic behavior) to satisfy the goal of representing the median voter.
2.

Other Characteristicsof Agency Choice

The agency decisionmaking environment has other characteristics that make it less susceptible to the interest group influence and
strategic behavior that accompany the legislative decisionmaking environment.1 6 1 Of course, bureaucrats do not all have the right to vote
on each decision the agency makes; therefore, even if individual bureaucrats represented distinct constituencies, they would not face the
same incentive to vote-trade as do legislators. Furthermore, the
agency's relatively narrow subject-matter jurisdiction not only narrows
bureaucrats' preferences, it reduces the opportunity for strategic behavior to infect the decisionmaking process. For agency bureaucrats,
most of the important policy choices that they face are salient to them.
For legislators, whose subject-matter jurisdiction is broad, relatively
few of the choices (read: votes) they make are salient to them, which
creates an incentive for vote trading and can lead to legislative choices
that lie far from the preferences of the median voter. 162 In other
words, even if agency decisonmakers could trade votes (or make analogous bargains), they would be less likely to do so because there is less
variation in salience among agency policy choices.
In addition, unlike legislators, agency decisionmakers have a national constituency. Legislative logrolling is only possible because
Congress's constituency is heterogeneous: for every issue, there are
members of the legislative decisionmaking group who represent minority interests. Coordination by those legislators across issues (logrolling) can produce a series of policy choices that deviate from the
interests of the median voter. Agency bureaucrats, like the President,
have a national constituency and do not face this incentive. This is
159 In Spence & Cross, supra note 1, we suggested that support for free trade might be
very information-elastic: that as liberals and conservatives alike are exposed to more of the
teachings of neo-classical economics, both groups will be more likely to support free trade,
even though conservatives may have been more predisposed to do so in the first place.
160
See id. at 124-29.
161 In Arrow's world, any departure from conditions of democratic choice is problematic. My argument in this section is that in the real world, agencies depart from those
conditions in ways that are less problematic than the ways in which legislators depart from
them.
162 Note that vote trading can help the trader better represent her constituents by
securing policies on high-salience issues that are closer to her constituents' preferences.
By definition, those policies will be further from the median voter's preferences as a result.
This is policy logrolling.
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not to say that agency bureaucrats' preferences are homogenous.
One can imagine that bureaucrats, in regional offices might be more
sympathetic to local concerns than headquarters' bureaucrats, for example. However, the agency decisionmaking process affords minority
subsets of the agency little leverage to translate their preferences into
policy. One cannot imagine the agency policymaking process producing something analogous to the salvage-logging rider,1 63 for example,
even if agency bureaucrats in the Seattle field office favored the idea.
Furthermore, regardless of whether bureaucrats' preferences are heterogeneous, they do not represent distinct subsets of their constituency
the way legislators do. Consequently, they are unlikely to view it as
their duty to represent that subset, especially when doing so runs con164
trary to the interests of most of their other constituents.
In addition, the legislative process offers more-and more effective-avenues of influence for private sector rent-seekers. The ability
to influence legislators' reelection prospects through campaign contributions, issue advertising, and the like, offers well-heeled interest
groups much greater leverage over legislators than over agency bureaucrats, thanks primarily to the electoral connection. These avenues of influence make legislators more responsive to specific subsets
of their constituents, but only increase the temptation to serve those
interests at the expense of the median constituent (and, therefore,
the median voter) whenever possible. While earlier public choice
scholars have stressed the ways in which rent-seeking private interests
exert influence over agencies, those routes to influence seem both less
effective and more transparent than the analogous routes to legislative influence. Whether or not industry exerts influence by virtue of
its overrepresentation in the administrative process, it cannot contribute money to help bureaucrats keep or lose their jobs. Furthermore,
contacts between interest groups and agencies are, for the most part,
on the record because the Administrative Procedure Act requires
agencies to explain their decisions and to base them on that record;
1 65
not so for legislators.
163 The salvage-logging rider was a non-germane rider attached to a very popular 1995
disaster relief bill by western Senators. The bill became law. The rider contained provisions which were opposed by environmentalists and which many believed could not have
been passed but for their inclusion in an otherwise popular bill concerning unrelated
matters.
164 One strain of capture theory argues that agencies come to think of regulated industries as their clients, abandoning the regulatory mission in favor of protection of the client
industry. In Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 121-23, we suggested that there is little or no
remaining support for capture as a general theory of regulation, and that evidence demonstrates that capture does not describe most agencies today.
165
I do not mean to imply here that ossification is the first defense against capture, or
that "collaborative governance" promotes capture. To the contrary, the administrative process retains these characteristics without relying exclusively on rules and rulemaking. Fur-
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C. From Static to Dynamic: Representation vs. Responsiveness
In sum, modem agency policymaking is designed to guard
against the kind of manipulation to which the legislative process is
inherently vulnerable. However, one might argue that there are at
least two positive attributes to the electoral connection that this analysis overlooks. First, the electoral connection offers voters recourse
against those who make bad policy choices; we can vote out legislators,
but we cannot vote out bureaucrats. Second, it offers an avenue for
expressing preference intensity, and preference intensity should count
166
in the policymaking process.
The latter argument goes as follows. When we define good policy
in terms of the median voter's wishes, we implicitly reject the goal of
maximizing cardinal utility. Vote trading increases voters' utility. If
agency decisionmaking fails to facilitate these kinds of gains from
trade, that is a defect of that process, not a virtue. By insulating
agency bureaucrats from electoral pressure, we deaden their ability to
sense differences in preference intensities. Therefore, they will be less
likely to produce policies that maximize voters' utility; electorally accountable legislators, free to trade their votes, will be more likely to
produce policies that maximize voters' utility. Logrolling, for lack of a
1 67
better word, is good.
There are two rejoinders to this argument. First, vote trading
may produce efficiency improvements, but only in the Kaldor-Hicks
sense. 168 Vote trading does not produce Pareto improvements over
ther, as I explain infraat notes 169-72 and accompanying text, the agency's key advantage
over Congress is its ability to deliberate. Jody Freeman, Laura Langbein, and others have
demonstrated that deossification can promote deliberation without risking capture, because (1) the early inclusion of stakeholders in the decisionmaking process improves deliberation, and (2) agency bureaucrats retain ultimate decisionmaking power and remain

subject to the various decisionmaking requirements that ensure transparency. See Freeman, supra note 65; Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENvrt. L.J. 60 (2000); Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kenvin,
Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical
Evidence, 10J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599 (1998).
166 In Spence & Cross, supra note 1, we addressed the argument that, whatever its
democratic virtues, delegation is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the Founders' vision of the policymaking process as reflected in the Constitution. Our rejoinder
was that delegation is not only consistent with the Founders' vision, it is unavoidable and
necessary, and cannot be prohibited without restricting legislative choice in harmful ways.
I will not repeat those arguments here. See id. at 131-40.
167 This argument applies not only to vote trading aimed at benefiting the median
constituent; it also applies to some cases where legislators facing little or no electoral risk
deviate from the wishes of their median constituent in order to benefit powerful interest
groups. When the issue is low-salience for most voters, legislators may attend to the wishes
of those groups for whom the issue has higher salience, even if their preferences deviate
considerably from those of the median voter.
168 An outcome is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the winner's gains exceed the losses suffered by the losers, thereby making the aggregate better-off. RicHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALysis OF LAw 13 (3d ed. 1986)
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sincere issue-by-issue voting. When a few legislators swap their lowsalience votes for another's high-salience vote, they decrease the utility of the majority of non-participants in the trade by producing a policy that lies further from their ideal points. The trade produces a net
gain in cardinal utility enjoyed by a few, but at the cost of losses suffered by many. By adding three more unnecessary new military bases
to the defense budget bill, legislators may make three members of the
House of Representatives very happy at the cost of small decreases in
utility for the other 432 members. While this is Kaldor-Hicks efficient
if the three members' utility gain exceeds the 432 members' utility
loss, it is certainly debatable whether it is a "better" outcome.
Second, and more importantly, this view ignores the role of information and deliberation in the process of representation. Logrolling
may increase rationally ignorant voters' utility over outcomes, but that
is not what voters want from government. The essence of representation is the ability to choose the policies voters would choose ifthey had
full information and the opportunity to deliberate. This is whatJames
Madison meant when he expressed a preference for government that
would serve constituents' "permanent" or "true" interests rather than
their "passions."' 69 This idea also lies at the core of the classic
Burkean concept of representation: 'Your representative owes you,
not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion .... [G] overnment and
legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination
"170

Burke's words draw the distinction between responsiveness and
representation, one that highlights the static nature of some utilitymaximizing models. The problem is that, often enough, legislators
are responsive to voters' immediate and uninformed preferences over
policy choices, not their well-informed preferences. 171 In other
words, outcomes that maximize the utility of rationally ignorant voters
may not be what voters want from government. Voters may conclude

169
The Federalist is replete with references to this idea. Government must not be too
responsive to factions, even majority factions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison). It must avoid the "temporary errors and delusions" that come from that kind of
responsiveness. Rather, it should respond to the "deliberate sense" of the community. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).

170 BuRKE's POLITICS 115 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (Edmund
Burke's speech to the Electors of Bristol, November 3, 1774).
171 This is part of the reason why political scientist GaryJacobson has described Congress as responsive, but not responsible. SeeJACOBSON, supra note 107, at 211-23. For a
more detailed explanation of why the agency's information advantages can help it produce
more representative decisions, see Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 124-28.
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that the agency's judgment is therefore a more valuable commodity
than the legislator's judgment. 172
It is not only voters who seem to sense this problem; Congress
does too. It seems apparent that Congress does not like the results of
logrolling, even if it cannot quite help itself from doing so. Hence, in
statutes like the Line Item Veto Act 73 and recent base closure acts,' 74
Congress seems to be saying "stop me before I logroll again." Congress may be tying its own hands out of a sense that voters would prefer to forgo their slice of pork if other voters will do the same. 175 In
situations like these, delegation is one way to serve voters' better-informed preferences, and not just in the context of classic pork-barrel
legislation. In the hypothetical Clean Air Act example summarized in
Table 3, it seems entirely plausible that legislators might produce legislation containing the less popular policies (lb, 2b); yet it seems much
less plausible that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would
have produced that result if Congress had delegated those decisions
to the agency.
Even if agencies are less inclined to deviate from the well-informed preferences of the median voter, does not the absence of electoral accountability make those deviations more risky when they do
occur? The answer is: not necessarily; for reasons suggested by Figure
2, the policy process seems equally well equipped to address any such
deviations by agencies or Congress. If a mission-oriented agency drifts
away from the preferences of the median voter, politicians (and interest groups) have an electoral incentive to publicize that fact and to
take action. In fact, the prospects for a legislative (or presidential)
correction are a function of how successful those efforts to increase
the issue's salience will be.' 76 The good news is that it will be easier to
increase the salience of an issue when the agency has deviated from
172 This is the essence of John Rohr's deliberation-based argument, and Mark
Seidenfeld's "civic republican" justification, for agency autonomy. See, e.g., ROHR, supra
note 97; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustiwfcationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1512 (1992). In Spence & Cross, supranote 1, at 141-42, we noted that this view is
entirely consistent with the Federalist papers' defense of the constitutional design. For a
fuller argument to this effect, see Seidenfeld, supra,at 1514.
173 See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Star. 1200 (1996).
174
See, e.g., Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988).
This is, of course, a collective action problem-one that Congress solves by placing
175
the decision process in the hands of a third party.
176 Note that this is true when the agency has drifted away from the median voter, not
from politicians. When the agency drifts away from politicians, they will not try to publicize that drift unless it also represents a movement away from voters' preferences. Hence,
politicians' ability to control agencies with which they are unhappy is a function of the
relative popularity of the agencies' policy positions. For a discussion of this distinction
between control of agencies by politicians and indirect control by voters, see Spence, supra
note 59; and Spence & Cross, supra note 1.
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the median voter's preferences, particularly her well-informed preferences.
That is, interest groups and politicians make an issue more salient by
educating voters about the issue, thereby creating better-informed voters. As we argued in A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State.
As voters acquire more information, they are increasingly able to
judge for themselves whether [the agency's choice] is a good or a
poor approximation of [their well-informed preferences].... [I] n a
world of scarce resources, it would be irrational for an interest
group opposed to an agency policy to engage in a sustained lobbying effort against the agency choice if it suspects that [well-informed
77
voters will not oppose it].1
Likewise, because politicians are responsive to voters' immediate
preferences, they must make the same calculation before opting to
spend political capital to overturn agency policy choices. Agencies
know this, and given their information advantages, are often in the
best position to estimate where the median voter's fully informed preferences will ultimately lie. This is not to say that this dynamic operates
in a perfect, frictionless way; it can be slow and imperfect, but it nevertheless exists. 178 Thus, even if political control of agencies is difficult
and costly, 179 the risk of a runaway bureaucracy is overstated because
political control of agencies is limited, not in spite of it.18 °
Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 129.
In Spence & Cross, we cited examples in which this dynamic seemed to work relatively quickly and efficiently. See id. In one such instance-the unhappy tenure of Anne
Burford in the early Reagan Administration-congressional Democrats persisted in their
attempts to publicize the Administration's environmental policies, betting that better-educated voters would be outraged by them. Within two years, the Administration gave up the
bulk of its efforts to relax enforcement of the hazardous waste laws, and Burford resigned
in disgrace. See id. at 129-31. On other occasions, this dynamic works more slowly and less
efficiently. Two other examples I have studied in depth-the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC's) hydroelectric licensing program and the EPA's administration of
the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program-represent situations in which (i) critics
of the agency suspected that the agency's choices would be unpopular with well-informed
voters, but (ii) criticism produced change only slowly, and after a long period. In the
former example, critics persisted in their efforts to change the agency's policy for decades,
achieving steady but incremental gains throughout that time. See Spence, supra note 59
(describing slow but ultimately fundamental change at the FERC). In the latter example,
the EPA has grudgingly but steadily changed the way it seeks to impose liability on private
parties for hazardous waste site cleanups in response to steady complaints about the fair177

178

ness of the system. See David B. Spence, Imposing Individual Liability as a Legislative Policy
Choice: Holmesian "Intuitions"and Superfund Reform, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 389, 434-47 (1999).
179
See Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 128; see id. at 129-30 (suggesting some examples of this dynamic at work).
180 I have argued this point on at least two other occasions. See David B. Spence, Ad-

ministrativeLaw and Agency Policy-Making Rethinking the Positive Theory of PoliticalControl 14
407, 438-46 (1997); Spence & Cross, supra note 1, at 129. In this view I am

YALEJ. ON REG.

joined by many administrative law scholars, whose analyses of the merits of agency autonomy are many and varied. See, e.g., SUSAN ROsE-AcaElmAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE
AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992); Yvette Barksdale, The
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But isn't it true that politicians will face this very same dynamic?
In other words, when politicians choose policies that deviate from the
wishes of the public,' 8 ' interest groups will mobilize to publicize that
fact, increasing the electoral risks of that course of action for politicians. One might argue, therefore, that electoral risk gives voters a
much more direct tool for controlling politicians' (mis)behavior. It is
true that voters have this tool, but it is not an easy tool to use. For
politicians, whose policy jurisdiction is broad and multidimensional,
the relationship between any single policy choice and electoral risk is
usually a weak one. At the same time, the incumbency advantage is
potentially powerful.' 8 2 A legislator does not create electoral risk each
time she votes against the interests of her constituents, though too
many such votes can create risk. Furthermore, legislatures can produce policies that poorly represent the median voter without creating
electoral risk for individual legislators, for all the reasons described in
Part II.A.' 8 3 All of this makes the electoral connection an unreliable
tool for ensuring that legislative choices represent the median voter.
CONCLUSION

By conceiving of policymaking and delegation in this way, I have
attempted to show how public choice analyses can illuminate the normative side of what is an essentially procedural problem.' 8 4 In my focus on procedure, I join a long list of scholars who assume that these
procedural questions are important. Of course, there is a growing call
within administrative law for shifting our attention away from procedure and toward a focus on "substance"-that is, on defining the
proper objects of our regulatory attention. 8 5 This analysis addresses
those arguments only indirectly: first, by offering the well-informed
wishes of the median voter as the goal of policymaking; and second,
Presidency and Administrative Value Section, 42 AMl. U. L. REv. 273 (1993) (arguing that
greater presidential control will produce inferior decisions for a variety of reasons).
181
Part II.B.1, supra, explains why the risk of such deviation is small.
182 See, e.g., FENNO, supra note 107; JACOBSON, supra note 107.
183 A heterogeneous constituency can further complicate this relationship in ways that

mirror the legislative issue salience/vote trading dynamic described in Part IIA..4. For
example, a legislator may be able to maximize electoral support by attending to the highintensity preferences of unrepresentative subsets of her constituency, rather than to the
median voter's preferences.
184
This is certainly a "proceduralist" analysis, in the Matthew Adler taxonomy. See
Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Effwiency and Procedure:A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST.
L. REv. 241 (2000). Because serving the interests of the median voter fails to identify an
objective theory of the good, I assume that Adler would conclude that this analysis is an
insufficient framework for evaluating agencies in the same ways other proceduralist analyses are. On the other hand, this analysis offers a kind of justification for "weak paternalism" that is not unlike Adler's.
185 Id.; seeJoseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49
ADMIN. L. REv. 377 (1997).

444

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:397

by showing that procedure matters. Thus, my argument here is mostly
consistent with a variety of other proceduralist, neo-Progressive justifications for agency autonomy, such as Steve Croley's recent argument
that agencies can provide "public interested regulation," 86 Mark
Seidenfeld's "civic republican" justification, 1 87 Jody Freeman's argument for "collaborative governance," 188 and others that stress the
value of agency deliberation in the policy process. By emphasizing the
internal protections against capture that are built into the administrative process, my argument is quite obviously inconsistent with analyses
that legitimate agency policymaking by way of politicians' control over
that process, such as unitary executive/strong presidentialism arguments 189 or congressional dominance arguments. 190 For these same

reasons, it is fundamentally different from traditional theories that
emphasize the need for strong judicial oversight of the administrative
process to guard against capture, 19 1 though perhaps not in direct conflict with weaker versions of that argument. At the same time, this
analysis echoes those who claim that there is no "neat solution" to the
192
problem of agency legitimacy.
Nevertheless, even as public choice scholarship mocks the
Progressives' faith in an apolitical public administration, it nicely illuminates the very problems of special-interest influence with which
the Progressives were concerned. Thus, one need not be cynical to
believe that policymakers are goal-maximizers, or to acknowledge that
powerful centrifugal forces in the legislative process can facilitate the
exercise of that influence. Nor does one need to be naive to conclude
that the administrative process is less susceptible to those dangers. It
is true that public choice scholarship rejects as ill-defined and idealized such notions of representation as Rousseau's participatory democracy' 93 or the pure Weberian state. However, public choice does
not deny the importance of minimizing special-interest influence in
the policy process; nor does it deny that policymakers pursue, and
sometimes produce, policies that serve the interests of the median
voter. To the contrary, as I have tried to demonstrate in this Article,
186
Croley, supra note 128. Croley also defends public choice analysis in ways consistent with this analysis.
187 Seidenfeld, supra note 172.
188 Freeman, supra note 65.

189

See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive 48

Aiut. L. REv. 23 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPowerto
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1.
190 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

191
192
193

For a discussion of this literature, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
See Farina, supra note 76, at 989.
See RiKER, supra note 37, for the public choice response to Rousseau.
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the public choice framework helps us to understand the ways in which
policymaking processes can be more or less susceptible to the introduction of "impertinent considerations" to which Professor Landis referred so long ago. I have also tried to demonstrate that for many
policy choices, a twenty-first-century version of public choice analysis
shows us how the twenty-first-century administrative state helps to reduce that risk and to produce policies that represent the interests of
the median voter.
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APPENDIX

EXPLANATION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT HYPOTHETICAL

19 4

Table A-1 contains the results of voting in pairwise contests be-

tween each of the possible policy combinations in Table 2 of the text.
The alternatives in the matrix represent the combinations of more
(la) or less (ib) stringent sulphur dioxide emissions reduction policies, and more (2a) or less (2b) flexible approaches to permitting fuel
switching by plants charged with achieving those reductions. The results reported (W=winner; L=loser) are for the row alternatives when
paired against each of the column alternatives. Assuming sincere voting-that is, assuming voters cannot or do not act strategically with
prior knowledge of the agenda and do not trade votes-we can trace
any of a variety of outcomes given this set of alternatives and
preferences.
APPENDIX TABLE A-I
RESULTS OF PAIRWISE COMPARISON

lb 2a
lb 2a
lb
lb 2b
la 2a
la
la 2b

L
L
W
W
W

lb

lb 2b

la 2a

la

la 2b

W

W
W

L
W
W

L
L
W
W

L
L
L
W
W

L
L
W
W

L
L
W

L
L

L

Cycling
In the absence of agenda control, this set of preferences over alternatives could produce cycling for an indefinite period of time, regardless of which alternative is first reported to the floor. For
example, it is clear from Table A-1 that if we begin with proposal lb 2a
(the less stringent, more flexible alternative), then:
1. la defeats lb 2a, because liberals and Eastern Coal representatives prefer the former;
2. la 2a defeats la;
3. lb 2b defeats la 2a;
4. lb defeats lb 2b;
5. lb 2a defeats lb; and
6. the original proposal, lb 2a, defeats lb.

Of course, this cycle exists regardless of which alternative is initially
reported to the floor.
194

See supra Part II.A.4.
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ProducingOutcome la 2a
If the leadership controls the number and order of consideration
of amendments and wants to produce the more stringent, more flexible legislative outcome la 2a, it can do so regardless of which of the
other alternatives is initially reported to the floor. Of course, it is evident from Table A-1 that alternative la 2a would defeat three of the
other alternatives (lb 2a, la,and la 2b) in direct head-to-head competition; however, there are paths to this same result when any of the
other alternatives are proposed instead. The most direct of these
other paths to passage is illustrated in Figure A-1.
APPENDIX FIGURE

A-1

PRODUCING THE MORE STRINGENT, MORE

FLEXIBLE OUTCOME*

lb 2b

lb
Ia 2b

Ia 2b

Ia
Ia 2a

Ia 2a

Ia

la 2a

Ia 2a

The initially reported alternative is in bold type in this figure. The amendment process is
diagramed using a flow chart.

For example, in the first diagram in Figure A-i, alternative lb 2b
(containing the less stringent, less flexible policies) is the starting
point. The first amendment offered is to substitute the more stringent emissions reduction policy (la 2b). As Table 3 in the text indicates, both liberals and Eastern Coal representatives prefer this
alternative, and the amendment will pass. The next amendment in
this diagram proposes to substitute the more flexible fuel-switching
provision into the bill (yielding alternative la 2a); that amendment
passes with the support of both liberals and conservatives.
Producing Outcome lb 2b
Leaders who control the amendment process could also produce
the opposite outcome-the less stringent, less flexible outcome (lb
2b)-even though a two-thirds majority prefers more stringent emissions reductions and more flexibility on fuel switching. The lb 2b alternative defeats two of the others (la 2a and la) in a head-to-head
vote. Note that of the three remaining alternatives (lb 2a, lb, and la
2b), all are defeated by alternative la; alternative lb 2b, in turn, defeats
alternative la. Figure A-2 illustrates this short route to the desired
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outcome beginning with one of these three alternatives, alternative lb
2a. The process would be identical for the other two.
APPENDIX FIGURE

A-2

PRODUCING THE LESS STRINGENT, LESS FLEXIBLE OUTCOME

lb 2a

lb 2b

